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PREFACE 
A detailed monograph of Georgia and the War of 1812 is worthy 
of attentive study. There have been a few accounts written about events 
that occurred in Georgia daring the war, but an examination of the 
records indicates no current study that attempts to bring these events 
together and relate them, to the conflict. This the writer has attempted 
to do. 
I would like to acknowledge those who aided in the completion 
of this project. First, to Dr. Jack Nelson Averitt, Chairman of the 
Social Science Division of Georgia Southern College, who suggested 
the topic and who read the manuscript and made many valuable suggestions. 
I am also indebted to Dr. John Perry Cochran who served as second 
reader, and to Dr. Julia Frances Smith who served as third reader. I 
gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the library staff of Georgia 
Southern College, particularly to Mrs. Mae C. Olliff and Mrs. Mildred B. 
Sanders for their help. I must also thank the staff of the University 
of Georgia Library, the staff of the Georgia Department of Archives and 
History and Mrs. Lilla M. Hawes of the Georgia Historical Society for 
their assistance. Finally, to my wife, Fay Campbell Akins, and to my 
son and daughter, Terry and Tina, I owe a debt I can never describe or 
repay. 
B.L.A. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE APPROACHING CONFLICT, 1008-1812 
The War of 1812 was almost five years in the making. From 
1807 until war was officially declared, the United States government, 
seeking to avoid the seemingly inevitable conflict, passed an embargo 
and a non-intercourse act and used most every facet of diplomacy to 
coerce Great Britain to respect the commercial rights of the United 
States. The foreign policy of the United States during this period 
created serious discord among the people, with the result that when war 
was declared, Americans entered the conflict a divided people. 
President Thomas Jefferson could have reduced much of the agitation that 
later followed had he taken advantage of the wave of patriotism which 
swept the country in 1807 and chosen war rather than a temporizing 
measure. In the summer of 1807, the British committed an overt act 
which stirred American patriotism to a height unseen since the Revolu¬ 
tion. This incident culminated in a loud clamor for strong retaliatory 
measures against England with the Republicans being the most vociferous 
political agitators. 
On June 22, 1807, the American frigate, the Chesapeake, bound for 
service in the Mediterranean, weighed anchor from Norfolk, Virginia. 
About ten miles at sea she was hailed by a British warship, the Leopard, 
whose captain demanded the surrender of seamen alleged to be deserters 
from the British naval service. The captain of the Chesapeake refused 
2 
to obey the British order. Without warning, the Leopard fired point- 
blank on the American ship, killing three and wounding eighteen crewmen. 
The stricken vessel was then boarded and four men were removed.^ When 
the Chesapeake struggled back to Norfolk, public reaction was immediate 
and loud. Protests from all sections of the country, particularly in 
the middle Atlantic and southern states, denounced the incident as an 
outrageous violation of American sovereigity. For a time, the United 
States wavered on the brink of war. 
Although the Chesapeake incident aroused public feelings to a 
state of concern unparalleled since the days of the Revolution, it was 
but one of several grievances which the United States had against England. 
Since the Treaty of Paris, signed in 1783» hostilities had been smolder¬ 
ing between the two countries. British occupation of forts in the 
Northwest in violation of the treaty, and their intrigues with the Indians, 
who frequently attacked American settlements, met with vigorous American 
protest. Boundary and commercial disputes created further anti-British 
sentiments among Americans. These conflicts, together with British 
demands, combined to create an ever widening gulf between Bhgland and 
America. The British demanded that Americans indemnify the British for 
debts owed to English merchants on the eve of the Revolution. They 
further demanded that the United States government either restore or 
^"Washington National Intelligencer, June 26, 1007. 
2lbid., June 29, July 1, 3, 8, 10, 1807. Strongly worded 
resolutions, approved by citizens' meetings throughout the country, 
appeared on the above dates denouncing the Chesapeake incident and 
pledging support to the government in any measure it wished to pursue 
in retaliation. 
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compensate the Loyalists' for property confiscated during the 
Revolution. Moreover, tension had mounted over the attempt of the 
United States to steer a middle course in her dealings with both 
Bigland and France during the Napoleonic wars. For several years the 
United States had suffered a series of humiliating offenses at the hands 
of both England and France. Great Britain, however, was the chief 
offender. 
Handicapped by manpower shortages, after 1803 the Royal Navy 
began impressment of sailors from merchant vessels. Many British seamen, 
in search of better conditions of work and pay, deserted to American 
employment, and the Royal Navy sought to stop the drain of experienced 
manpower. Mistakes and abuses inevitably occurred and British boarding 
parties seized both native and naturalized American seamen from American 
decks. It is estimated that between 1803 and 1812 a total of ten 
thousand American seamen were forcibly taken from American merchant ships 
and impressed into British naval service.-^ The British government further 
infuriated Americans by imposing restrictions on American carriers 
sailing between France, Spain and their West Indian possessions. The 
British government, invoking the formula of the Rule of War of 1756, 
denied American merchants the right to participate in a direct wartime 
carrying trade which had not been open to them in time of peace. 
Americans evaded this prohibition by the subterfuge of paying duties at 
3samuel Flagg Bends, A Diplomatic Hi story of the United States 
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1936), p. 1U5. (Hereinafter cited as 
Bends, Diplomatic History.) 
h 
American ports and claiming they made two separate "broken" voyages, 
following a plan open to them in peacetime.^ 
A British admiralty appeals court in the Essex case in 1805 
denied this practice as adequate proof of bona fide importation, a change 
of policy that British sea captains swiftly implemented in scores of 
seizures of American vessels. Sweeping interdicts against American 
commerce continued in 1806. The British ministry issued an Order in 
Ctxmcil in May which declared the entire northern coast of Europe from 
Brest to the Elbe River under blockade, but provided for strict and •uni¬ 
form enforcement of this measure along a more limited coast. An Order in 
Council in January, 1807, proclaimed the blockade of all coastal trade 
between enemy ports on the European continent. Another Order in Council 
dated November, 1807, declared all of Napoleon controlled Europe under 
blockade as if by naval forces in a most strict and rigorous manner. All 
ships and goods, British excepted, that violated this order were good and 
lawful prize. A second edict issued in the same month authorized neutral 
trade with the Continent, provided carriers first landed at a British 
port, entered their cargoes, and paid duty.^ 
Napoleon struck at American maritime commerce also, though not 
extensively until 1807. His navy defeated in 1805> at Trafalgar, he 
returned to economic warfare to force Britain to terms. An edict issued 
at Berlin in November, I806, initiated the famous Continental System. 
^Washington National Intelligencer, September 20, 1805; Bemis, 
Diplomatic History, p. Ihl. 
^Washington National Intelligencer, October 7, 16, 1805. 
^Ibid., March 16, 1807, January 22, l808j Bemis, Diplomatic 
History, pp. lU7, lU9. 
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The Berlin Decree declared the British Isles in a state of blockade and 
prohibited all trade including that of neutrals. All ships coming from 
the British Isles or carrying British goods were liable to seizure. 
The Milan Decree, promulgated in December, 1807, added a provision that 
ships sutmitting to British blockade regulations or permitting search 
7 
by British vessels would be seized. 
The British Orders in Council and the Berlin and Milan Decrees 
combined to make all American trade with either belligerent open to 
seizure and confiscation. Both powers after 1807 harassed American 
commerce. 
Protest, appeal, and in 1806 a non-importation act characterized 
g 
initial American response to British seizures and impressments. Still 
the British government refused to yield, giving no ground on the issue 
of impressment and offering little else on the other points at issue. 
The sweeping ban on all American exports and ship sailings promised 
better results. 
When Congress convened in October, 1807, President Thomas Jefferson, 
preferring economic coercion rather than war, proposed an embargo on all 
coranerce with the outside world as the most effective means of defend¬ 
ing American rights. He believed that the warring nations of Europe, 
rather than suffer the loss of American trade, would withdraw their 
7 
'Washington National Intelligencer, February 13, 1807, February 22, 
1808 j Bemis, Diplomatic History, pp. lUb, 150. 
O 
Annals of Congress, 9 Cong., 1 sess., I, 51, 90. The Non- 
Importation Act prohibited importation of such goods from Great Britain 
as could be obtained eithdr in the United States or in other foreign 
countries. By this restriction, the United States hoped to force England 
to respect the neutral rights of the nation. 
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obnoxious regulations. The Senate acted with great rapidity, referring 
the president's message to a committee and passing an Bnbargo Bill by 
a vote of twenty-two to six on the same afternoon that it received the 
request. The bill as proposed by the Senate confined American vessels 
to American ports and permitted foreign vessels to leave only in ballast 
or with cargo already on board. The House passed the Embargo Bill by 
o 
a vote of eighty-two to forty-four after two days' debate. Congress 
had concurred in Jefferson's embargo policy with the greatest alacrity. 
The bill received the president's assent on December 22. 
Georgia's congressmen were divided in their support of the 
Qnbargo Bill. In the Senate, William Harris Crawford and John Milledge 
split votes on the measure. Milledge voted for the embargo, but 
Crawford did not choose to support a measure which he believed to be 
fraught with so much danger to the country. Although he resented the 
outrages committed against the United States flag on the high seas, he 
was not certain that an embargo act was the proper method of correcting 
this situation.10 In the House of Representatives, George Michael Troup 
was the only member of the Georgia delegation to support the embargo. 
^Annals of Congress. 10 Cong., 1 sess., I, 50-51; II, 1217-1223. 
10Ibid., 11 Cong., 1 sess., I, 5Ul-5li7; see also Letter from 
Young Men of Augusta, Georgia to President John Adams, July 2, 1798, 
in J. E. D. Shipp, Giant Days or The Life and Times of William H. 
Crawford (Americus, Georgia: SoutKern Printers, 190977 pp. 217-?18. 
Several years earlier, Crawford, while a young school teacher at Richmond 
Academy in Augusta, Georgia, expressed similar concern over French 
insults to the American flag. On July 2, 1798, at a convention of young 
men held in Augusta, Crawford was appointed chairman of a committee to 
draft a memorial to President John Adams protesting French aggressions 
against commerce of the United States and pledging support for strong 
retaliatory measures. 
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Troup thought it the most effective measure that the government could 
adopt.^ Georgia's other Congressmen, William Bibb, Howell Cobb and 
Dennis Smelt, however, did not share Troup's sentiments on the embargo, 
and dissented. 
Although the majority of the congressmen did not agree on the 
expediency of laying an embargo, most Georgians, nevertheless, thought 
it a wise measure and vocally supported it. Even the editor of the 
conservative and erstwhile supporter of Federalism, the Savannah 
Columbian Museum and Advertiser, agreed that "the embargo was the next 
best measure for maintaining the national tonic" and that it gave the 
president "a new weapon of negotiation." For a time, said the editor, 
the embargo would be detrimental to both merchant and fanner in that it 
would reduce prices of American products and increase the price of 
foreign goods. Nevertheless, predicted the editor, it "will be a 
popular measure with all classes of people."^2 The editor of the Augusta 
Chronicle, a staunch supporter of Republicanism, also believed that the 
embargo would elicit the desired results from Great Britain, declaring 
that Congress had acted "patriotically" and "wisely" in enacting the 
measure.^ Similarly, both Governor Jared Irwin and his successor, 
David Byrdie Mitchell, thought Congress had acted in the best interests 
of the country. 
^Annals of Congress, 10 Cong., 1 sess., II, 1652. 
^Savannah Columbian Museum and Advertiser, January 12, 1808. 
(Hereinafter cited as Savannah Museum.) 
•^Augusta Chronicle, January 23, 1808. 
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More support for the embargo was engendered in November, 1808, 
when the Georgia General Assembly called up the question for considera¬ 
tion. In a memorial addressed to the president, the legislators declared 
that the "citizens of this state . . . feel happy that a measure has 
been adopted which they conceive to be . . . pacific and manly. 
Additional expressions of patriotism and support for the embargo marked 
the celebration of July h, 1808, by Georgians. In Augusta, toasters 
raised their glasses to the embargo declaring it to be "wise, just and 
equitable," and that "it exhibits to Foreign nations, that if they will 
not be just, we will be prudent.Despite this outpouring of enthusi¬ 
asm, however, Georgia's situation soon became one of despondency, result¬ 
ing from an economic stagnation produced by the embargo. 
The economic plight in which Georgians suddenly found themselves 
in 1808, however, was not all due to the embargo. Part of it was due to 
the state's rapid expansion. From the turn of the century, Georgia's 
population had grown rapidly. The 1800 census revealed that Georgia, 
next to Tennessee, was the fastest growing state in the Union, having 
^Journal of the House of the General Assembly of Georgia (1808), 
pp. 81-827 (Hereinafter cited as Georgia House JournaTT) 
■'■-'Augusta Chronicle, July 9, 1808. 
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increased by over one thousand per cent since 1790.^^ The increase in 
the number of Negro slaves between 1790 and 1820 reflects the growing 
importance of cotton production, the latter expansion resulting from 
the invention of the cotton gin in 1793 by ELi Whitney. 
As the state's production of cotton expanded, Georgians demanded 
and were granted additional land by the federal government as treaty 
after treaty was negotiated with the Creek Indians who occupied land to 
the west of Georgia. Treaties were made in 1802, 180U and 180$, by 
which all lands east of the Oanulgee River were ceded by the Indians to 
Georgia. This land, which was distributed by lottery to citizens of 
Georgia, attracted many settlers from Virginia and North Carolina. The 
influx of large numbers of people, the fertility of the newly acquired 
land, and the high price of cotton which was rapidly becoming the staple 
in Georgia made these early years of the nineteenth century prosperous. 
Fortunes were rapidly made, and speculation ran wild. Large debts were 
Century of Population Growth, 1790-1900 (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 190£), pp. L7, 90, 133. 
Population of Georgia 1790-1820 
Number of 
Year Number of Whites Negro Slaves Number Free Negro Total 
1790 52,886 29,261* 390 82,5bO 
1800 102,261 59,ii06 - 161,667 
1810 11*7,215 105,218 - 252,1*33 
1820 196,996 11*9,656 1,757 31*8,1*09 
Agpegate Amount of Persons Within the United States in the Year 1810, 
Third Census BookTWashington, 181177"pp. 86-81. (Hereinafter ciEecTas 
Third Census.1 Part of the growth in Negro slaves between 1800 and 
1810 reflect the large importation of Negroes during the years immediately 
preceding January 1, 1008, after which the trade in slaves was prohibited; 
Census for 1820, Fourth Census (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1821), 
pp. 28-29. 
contracted to purchase more and more Negro slaves and additional lend. 
Since 1800, large quantities of cotton from Georgia had been exported 
to Europe and from this trade her wealth was largely derived.^ However, 
the embargo bore down severely on the commercial activity of the state. 
With all sailings and exports prohibited, farmers and planters faced 
rapidly falling prices in a domestic market flooded with commodities. 
Cotton, which earlier had sold for as much as twenty-five to twenty-eight 
cents a pound, brought only ten to thirteen cents in l809» The price 
continued its downward trend, until it reached a low of six cents a 
n p 
pound in the summer of 1812. Individuals who had contracted large 
debts during a period of prosperity prior to the embargo suddenly found 
that they could not liquidate them. Universal bankruptcy hung over the 
19 
state. The plight of the debtor could easily be followed by the large 
number of sheriff's sales which were advertised daily in the several 
newspapers over the state. 
Savannah, the principal seaport town in Georgia, with a popula¬ 
tion of five thousand, suffered acutely from the embargo. Her once busy 
harbor where fleets of snail vessels came in with loads of produce from 
the West Indies, and went out laden with rice, tobacco, cotton and 
^Lucian Lamar Knight, A Standard History of Georgia and Georgians, 
6 Volumes (New Yorks The Lewis~Publishlng Company, 1917), I, k&O; 
George Oilman Staith, The Story of Georgia and Georgia People, 1732-1860 
(Hacon: G. G. Smith, 1900), p. "ZShi Lewis Cecil Gray, History of 
Agriculture in the Southern United States to i860, 2 Volumes (New York: 
Peter Smith,~T9lilT, H, 683. It is estimated that in 1801 Georgia 
produced 10,000,000 pounds of cotton, valued at $1,900,000. 
l®Augusta Chronicle, December 31, 1813. 
^Augusta Mirror of the Times, October 9, 1809. (Hereinafter 
cited as Augusta Mirror.7"" 
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lumber, was now idle. Ehthusiasm, expressed earlier by civic leaders 
for the embargo, quickly turned to despair. Less than a month after the 
enactment of the embargo one correspondent despondently reported that 
the citizens of Savannah were "all in the dumps about the Snbergo" as 
2Q 
there had been "no sale for produce since the act has been enforced." 
The effects of the embargo were felt in diverse ways. One 
illustration of the dire financial crisis centers on Whip, a celebrated 
imported stallion, owned by one Rdward Jordan of Washington, Georgia. 
The stallion's services were widely advertised by his owner who claimed 
that two of Whip's sons had won the United States sweepstakes. The usual 
fee for the thoroughbred's services was normally thirty-one dollars, 
but because the embargo had made money scarce, payment was reduced and 
could be made in cotton. However, on April 2, 1808, a report circulated 
that Whip had been removed from service as he was in the custody of the 
21 local sheriff. His owner, like numerous other Georgians, was unable 
to meet the obligations of his debts. 
With debtors defaulting in payment of debts, loan foreclosures 
became numerous. As a result, civil courts in several counties were 
suspended in the spring of 1808, and petitions from grand juries were 
sent to the governor recommending legislative intervention. The pressure 
of petitions from the grand juries, together with pleas made by several 
prominent citizens throughout the state prompted Governor Jared Irwin 
to call a special session of the General Assembly to convene on May 9, 
^Augusta Chronicle, January lU, 1808. 
23-Ibid., April 2, 1808. 
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at Milledgeville, new seat of the state capitol. When the lawmakers 
assembled, the governor immediately requested that they devise some 
means of relieving the financially distressed citizens. Irwin pointed 
out that although the embargo had brought temporary distress and sub¬ 
jected Georgians to many privations, it was viewed by him as the only 
means the United States had within her power to avoid becoming a party 
in the wars which had so long raged in Europe. He was confident that 
the people of Georgia would "acquiesce with cheerfulness in the wise 
measure" of the federal government.^ 
The legislature concurred with the governor's request. A bill 
entitled "An Act to Alleviate the condition of Debtors, and Afford them 
temporary Relief" was introduced, debated and passed in the Georgia 
House on May 16, 1808, by a vote of thirty-two to twenty-four.*^ The 
Alleviating Act, which provided that one third of a debt be paid when 
due, and granted debtors additional time for payment of the remainder, 
met with strong opposition among some members of the House. Those who 
opposed the measure had "great doubts" as to its constitutionality 
inasmuch as it "tends to violate that article of the Constitution which 
declares . . . that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation 
of contract." Furthermore, the opponents of the bill believed that even 
if the act were not in violation of the Constitution it deprived the 
creditor of his rights of enforcing payment.^ 
^Georgia House Journal (Special Session, May, 1808), pp. 5-9. 
23Ibid., pp. 17, 29, 52-6U. 
forbid., pp. 129-130. 
13 
The Alleviating Act, intended originally to be a temporary 
measure, was reenacted annually by subsequent legislatures, becgming 
a source of dissension among the legislators. The public divided in 
their sentiments over the measure. Those belonging to the creditor 
group, or who were closely aligned with them, denounced the act as 
unconstitutional, while those of the debtor class generally applauded 
the act. Despite creditors' strong denunciation of the Alleviating 
Act, however, the debtor class wielded the power. Being more numerous, 
they exerted sufficient pressure on the legislators who continued to 
submit to the debtors' wishes, reenacting the bill from year to year. 
The Alleviating Act provided Georgians with ample opportunity 
to vent their emotions. Debate on the merits of the act often degenerated 
into bitter disputes between creditor and debtor. One vociferous 
opponent was Thomas Charlton of Savannah, Judge of the Eastern District. 
The judge, speaking before the Grand Jury of Glynn County in November, 
1808, agreed that something should have been done to ameliorate the 
condition of debtors, but expressed grave concern that the legislature 
had passed an act so bread in scope. He denounced the act as unconsti¬ 
tutional and urged the grand jury to petition the legislature for its 
repeal. 
The Alleviating Act found further disfavor with the editor of the 
Augusta Mirror of the Times. In a strongly worded editorial on November 20, 
1809, the editor denounced the act, Governor Irwin, and members of the 
legislature who enacted it. Pointing out that by enacting the law, the 
^Augusta Mirror, November 28, 1808. 
lit 
government had impaired the obligation of contracts, the Augusta editor, 
while admitting that the power of the legislature was enormous, asserted 
that "it had past that limit to the point of being dangerous. 
The editors of the Mirror1 s rival journal, the Augusta Chronicle, 
generally supported the Alleviating Act but they too had some misgivings 
about the law. Apparently having difficulty collecting from their sub¬ 
scribers, the editors informed readers that they had received information 
from the "best authority" that the legislature by passing the law had 
never contemplated that subscribers should withhold their just debts 
from the press, "if they do withold /sic/, we shall be undone before 
27 
the 15th of December—no money—no paper—no Newsl" 
In l8lU, the Alleviating Act became an even greater source of 
antagonism. When the General Assembly met in October, the act was 
again reenacted by both houses of the legislature. This time, however, 
the governor, Peter Early, refused to give his assent to the bill. In 
his veto message. Early stated that the principle of alleviating a debt 
was unconstitutional for it impaired the obligation of contracts. The 
governor in concluding his veto message further declared that 
Contracts between individuals are matters of private right, and 
no reason of state can justify an interference with them. They are 
sacred things, and the hand of government can never touch them, 
without impairing public confidence. The alleviating system is 
believed to be injurious to the moral principles of the constitution. 
It accustoms men to consider their contracts as imposing no moral 
obligation, and by making fraud familiar, destroys the pride of 
honesty.28 
^Augusta Mirror, November 20, 1809. 
^Augusta Chronicle, June 25, 1808. 
qQ 
Journal of the Senate of the General Assembly of Georgia (l8lU), 
p. 38. (hereinafter cited as Georgia Senate Journal.) 
Despite Early*s dissent on the measure, the majority of the 
legislators did not agree with the governor, and promptly passed the 
bill over his veto. As a result of his unobliging conduct, Early was 
forced to retire to his Greene County home at the end of his first tern 
as governor in 181$. 
The extent that Georgia suffered economically from the embargo and 
the war which followed can further be seen in the decline of the dollar 
value of her exports between 1807 and l8l!u In 1807, prior to the enact¬ 
ment of the embargo, Georgia's exports were valued at $3,7liU,8U5. As a 
result of the embargo her exports plummeted to a paltry $2h,626 in 1808, 
and, not until 1815 did Georgia, s exports regain their former dollar 
value.29 
Georgia, with a dominant agrarian economy, suffered a severe 
economic set-back as a result of the embargo which cut off her exports 
of agricultural and timber products. With no economic alternative such 
as manufacturing, the state's plight remained critical throughout the war 
years. Yet, Georgians held high hopes in 1808 that new sources of 
^Adiel Sherwood, A Gazatteer of the State of Georgia (Washington: 
Peter Force, 1837), p. 917 (Hereinafter cited as SEerwood, Gazatteer.) 
Value of Exports for the State of Georgia, 1807-1815 
Year Total 
1807 $3,7Uh,8U5 
8 2U,626 
1809 1,082,108 
1810 2,238,686 
1811 2,568,866 
1812 1,066,701 
1813 1,09b,595 
l lb 2,183,121 
1815 b,172,319 
prosperity would compensate for those which were forfeited by the 
embargo. Every indication of manufacturing enterprise in the state was 
heralded by the press as a happy augury for Georgia. The editor of the 
Augusta Chronicle, in a burst of enthusiasm, declared that the "Metal 
and Genius of the American people are rising and bursting out . . . arts 
and manufacturing are every day coining to light . . . this crisis compels 
the American to look at home and seek for what he has been heretofore 
in debt to foreign nations. ..." The editor, anticipating that Georgia 
would share in the sudden surge of manufacturing, announced that in the 
future "a part of /the newspaper/ will be devoted to report such 
important and useful information."-^ However, the editor's optimism 
soon gave way to despair for the manufacturing system did not arise in 
Georgia as it did in the New England states j but rather the large 
extension of a system of household manufactures, familiar since colonial 
times. 
Some manufacturing did exist in the state but the results were 
meager. Iron forges and furnaces were in operation in several places 
in 1810, but due to the scarcity of capital and the high cost of labor 
these ventures proved unprofitable and ceased to exist after a short 
time. The same fate befell the factories for the production of cotton 
and woolen cloth, which had been established in two or three counties. 
In 1810, the WLlkes Manufacturing Company, located approximately twelve 
miles from Washington, Georgia, was incorporated with a capital of ten 
thousand dollars, and another factory was brought into operation about the 
^Augusta Chronicle, January 30, I8O8, February Ij, 1809. 
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same time on Little River in Morgan County.31 Both proved short-lived. 
In Gainesville, shoes were manufactured. Leather, shoes, hats, carriages, 
saddles, cabinet work, cotton and woolen cloth constituted the articles 
marketed. Some homespun was worn in the upper sections of the state, 
but little was produced in Georgia. 
A summary of Georgia manufactures in 1810 show the following in 
operation at that time: 
Manufactures for the State of Georgia, 181032 
Value 
Item Number in 
Manufactured Operation Amount Produced 
Cotton 1 3,000 yards 
Bloomeries 1 13.5 tons 
Forge 1 - 
Naileries 1 • 
Soap and Candles 1 30,000 candles 
100,000 lbs, soap 
Tanners 31 
Distilleries 126 51*5,212 gals. 
Brewery 1 1,878 barrels 
Gun Powder 2 2,500 lbs. 
Saw Mill 1 1,252,000 feet 
$ 1,875 
3,000 
3,680 
187,800 
18,500 
87,59U 
U62,390 
11,268 
1,25b 
25,oUo 
Georgians also owned 3 carding machines, 20,058 spinning wheels, 
and 13,290 looms. While the state produced 3,688,53U yards of cotton 
goods, valued at $1,797,26U in 1810, all except for 3,000 yards was 
produced in homes. In addition, Georgia home manufacturing produced a 
variety of other goods, including flaxen, hempen, assorted blends, 
woolens, stockings and bagging, all valued at $351,892.33 Despite a 
large household manufacturing, Georgia's production of goods was 
3lGeorgia House Journal (1811), p. 13j Sherwood, Gazatteer, p. 86. 
3^Third Census, pp. II48-I53. 
33ibid. 
18 
insufficient to support a population of over 250,000, consequently the 
people of Georgia had to look elsewhere for the necessities of life and 
for any luxuries that could be afforded. 
Georgians had always depended on others for manufactured products 
and most particularly Eh gland. Many a Georgian read English books, wore 
Eiiglish clothes, sat in Ehglish chairs and slept in English beds, cut 
his wood with English axes and ate out of English pewter dishes. The 
embargo, and later the non-intercourse acts, however, made it difficult 
for them to obtain manufactured goods, and even when products could be 
procured, prices were high. Instead of looking to Europe for manu¬ 
factured goods, the people of Georgia turned attention to the states of 
the north. 
Manufacturing in New EJagLand had made considerable progress as 
a result of the economic coercion placed on England. The embargo turned 
people's thoughts from the sea to the factory, and though New England 
was not aware of it, the embargo was a permanent blessing in disguise, 
for it laid the foundation of New England's commercial supremacy. 
Merchandise imported into Georgia from the North included furniture, 
gunpowder, carriages, oil cloth, gingham, calico, diapers, boots, saddles, 
thread, cotton bagging, flour, butter, cheese and corn beef. To obtain 
merchandise from American ports, Georgia merchants first had to secure a 
certificate from the governor indicating the items desired and the amount 
needed for a particular town.^ This restriction was imposed by a 
is I 
-^ Governor Jared Irwin to Charles Harris, Mayor of Savannah, 
June 22, 1808, in Governor's Letter Book A, 1802-1809, p. 255, Georgia 
Department of Archives and History. 
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presidential proclamation of June 6, 1808, because of flagrant violations 
of the embargo, particularly in New England. 
In contrast to Georgia, New England's patriotism was not as strong 
as her economic interests. Once the embargo cut into her profits, she 
reacted violently and vociferously, violating the embargo by carrying 
on a snuggling trade of gigantic proportion with Canada, at the same time 
bitterly denouncing the Bnbargo Act and the Republican administration 
in Washington. 
Followers of Federalism in Georgia joined in echoing the senti¬ 
ments of their New England brethren in opposition to the commercial 
restrictions which had been imposed on the United States by the 
Jefferson ackninistration. Unlike the New England states, Federalism 
had never been politically powerful in Georgia. Although it is true 
that Georgia was among the first to ratify the federal Constitution, 
approving it almost unanimously in 1788, this unanimity by Georgia in 
adopting the Constitution while other states bitterly fought over the 
matter, did not indicate that a Federalist party would later control the 
state. Rather, Georgians adopted the Constitution in the capacity of 
the people of a sovereign state, delegating certain specific powers to 
the federal government in order to increase its efficiency, but reserving 
to themselves and to their previously existing state government all 
rights and powers which were not expressly delegated in the Constitution. 
Consequently, such influences as the need of the state for national 
protection against the Indians on the west and the Spanish in Florida 
were more powerful than any party allegiance in causing the solid vote 
in favor of a strong central government.^ 
35uirich Bonnell Phillips, Georgia and State Rights (Washington: 
Government Printing Office. 1902). pp. 23-2U. 90. 
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What strength Federalism once possessed in elections ceased to 
exist by 1803. Its demise had been hastened when some of its local 
leaders were indicted in the unsavory Yazoo land fraud of 1796. As a 
result of this action the state, which had voted previously for George 
Washington, began to vote solidly Republican. Desoite the lack of 
political power, however, the Federalists still made up a vocal and 
aggressive minority in Augusta and Savannah. These supporters of 
Federalism came largely from the conservative, commercially minded 
aristocrats of the two cities. Such well known men as John McPherson 
Berrien, John Noel and Joseph Habsrsham of Revolutionary fame belonged 
to this group. The Federalists suffered from the restrictive measures 
of the Republican administration, and they viewed with abhorrence the 
steady influx of European iimigrants eager to embrace the radical ideas 
of Jefferson.^ The newspaper organs for the Federalists in Georgia 
were the Augusta Herald and the Savannah Columbian Museum. Later, in 
1012, the vociferous Savannah American Patriot joined the Herald and 
the Museum in denouncing Republicanism. 
As discontent over the embargo became increasingly more vocal. 
President Jefferson, after fourteen months of the "miserable experiment," 
yielded to the protest to repeal the measure. On March 1, 1809, the 
president signed a bill which had been passed by Congress repealing the 
embargo. After a year, the embargo had failed as a coercive instrument, 
not because cancellation of trade was a weak weapon, but because the 
^John Erwin Talmadge, "Georgia's Federalist Press and the War of 
1812," The Journal of Southern History, XIX (1953), U88. 
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hunger of American merchants for foreign goods and markets broke down 
all enforcement measures and produced a political crisis. 
Repeal of the embargo, however, was not accomplished without a 
struggle in both the Senate and the House. Although Crawford had voted 
against an embargo, he now led the fight in the Senate against its 
37 
repeal. He believed that the embargo should be given a fair trial, 
and when James Hillhouse of Connecticut, supported by Samuel White of 
Delaware and Timothy Pickering of Massachusetts, introduced a motion to 
repeal the Bnbargo Act, Crawford opposed the move. He was aware that 
there was some discontent, but believed that it was not widespread. In 
the South, the Georgian declared, "no measure is more applauded or more 
cheerfully submitted to than the Bnbargo. It has been viewed there as 
the only alternative to war. It is a measure which is enforced in that 
country at every sacrifice." The interests of no section of the Union 
"are more immediately affected by the measure than the Southern states— 
than the State of Georgia." He remained firm in support of the 
embargo, admitting with other Republicans that if it had not been highly 
successful, "we have every reason to believe that its failure to produce 
these effects has been connected with causes wholly adventitious; and 
^Crawford's enemies accused him of being in sympathy with the 
Federalist party, althou^i his opposition to the Bnbargo Act had no 
reference to party affiliation. His friends pointed to his actions 
here as indicative of independence of judgment rather than a leaning 
towards Federalist principles. However that may be, Crawford was a 
Republican and generally supported the administration of Jefferson and 
Madison. Philip Jackson Green, "William H. Crawford and the War of 
1812," Georgia Historical Quarterly, XXVI (191*2), 16-39. (Hereinafter 
cited as Green, "Crawford.11! 
^Annals of Congress, 10 Cong., 2 sess., I, 6U. 
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which may give way, if the nation adhered to the measure•" He hoped 
there was a "probability of its producing some effect on those who make 
it necessary for us to exercise this act of self denial."^ If the 
measure should be repealed and American vessels be permitted "to go out 
in the face of the present Orders in Council and blockading decrees and 
proclamations" they would be exposed to new insults. Crawford was willing 
to support a repeal of the embargo but stated that 
its substitute should be war, and no ordinary war. . . . How are 
these orders and decrees to be opposed but by war, except we keep 
without their reach? If the Qnbargo produces a repeal of these 
edicts, we effect it without going to war. Whenever we repeal the 
Embargo, we are at war, or we abandon our neutral rights. It is 
impossible to take the middle ground, and say that we do not abandon 
them by trading with Great Britain alone. Can arming our merchant 
vessels, by resisting the whole navy of Great Britain, oppose force 
with force? It is impossible. The idea is absurd.'4® 
If the administration nursed any apprehension because of Crawford's 
negative vote on the embargo, his courageous stand against its repeal 
doubtless was calculated to remove it. 
In the House of Representatives, the vote to repeal the embargo 
was eighty-one to forty. Troup and Bibb voted against repeal. Troup, 
in reply to John Randolph who called the embargo a measure of degrading 
submission, took the floor of the House and angrily retorted that it was 
not one of submission but "a measure of resistance, and of the most 
formidable resistance." In addition, Troup bitterly denounced the 
Federalists' charge that the southern states were anti-commercial as 
being "without even the shadow of foundation." Southerners were just as 
^Annals of Congress, 10 Cong., 2 sess., I, 68. 
^
0Ibid., 10 Cong., 2 sess., I, 63-73; ibid., 11 Cong., 2 sess., I, 
5ia-5i*7. 
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anxious for overseas markets to open again for warehouses were bulging 
with unsold cotton. The South had sacrificed as much commercial 
prosperity as any part of the Union, Troup asserted. How could it be 
said that the people of the South were enemies of commerce, he indignantly 
asked, when they raise seventy million pounds of cotton, but for which 
they have not a home market for ten million.^ 
As a substitute for the embargo. Congress passed a Non-Intercourse 
Act on March 1, 1809. This act opened up commerce with all the world 
except France and England and their dependencies. The act authorized 
the president to suspend operation of the act in favor of either 
belligerent that repealed its restrictions on American trade, ^s a 
coercive measure, however, non-intercourse was no more effective than the 
embargo. Crawford took no part in the debates on the Non-Intercourse 
Act, and unlike most "Warhawks," made no bombastic speeches in favor 
of war. In the House, both Bibb and Troup vigorously opposed the 
Non-Intercourse Act and voted against its enactment.^ Smelt voted for 
the act and Cobb was out of Washington at the time. The people of 
Georgia generally upheld the Non-Intercourse *ct. Both French and English 
goods were taboo, the students at the University of Georgie going so 
far as to appear dressed in homespun as they endorsed the protest. 
Three days after the repeal of the Embargo Act and the enactment 
of the Non-Intercourse Act, President Jefferson willingly handed over 
the reins of the presidency to his protege, James Madison. The 
^-Annals of Congress, 10 Cong., 2 sess., II, 603. 
^Ibid., 10 Cong., 2 sess., II, mtf-lh#), 161a. 
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Republican press in Georgia on the occasion paid tribute to the departing 
Jefferson. The editor of the Augusta Mirror eulogized Jefferson, stat¬ 
ing that although he had not pleased every individual in the nation, he 
had, nevertheless, pursued a course dictated by conscience, and that 
every act of his administration had emanated from immaculate motives.^ 
Jefferson's retirement in 1809 helped to bring about a significant 
change in the attitudes of many Georgians toward the policy of the United 
States government in its dealings with Great Britain. Soon after the 
revered Virginian stepped down from the Presidency, Georgians' attitudes 
began to shift from a reluctant acquiescence to one of militancy. As 
long as Jefferson occupied the Presidency, the people reluctantly 
followed the Republican leader's pacifist course in dealing with Qigland, 
but not so with his successor* James Madison did not enjoy the same 
devotion among the people of Georgia as had his predecessor. In fact, 
some Georgians assumed Madison to be weak and vacillating. Consequently 
they did not feel any restraint, which had been exercised during 
Jefferson's reign, in demanding that the Madison administration pursue a 
"get-tough policy" with Sigland. 
They deplored the vacillation of Congress in its dealings with 
Great Britain. They demanded action and declared their support for 
whatever strong measures the government might choose to take against the 
belligerent. The editor of the Augusta Mirror called for firmer action 
against Ehgland, and asserted that he hoped that the next Congress would 
not only talk but act, "'words, words, words,' only if continued will 
^Augusta Mirror, March 13, 1809 
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destroy the independence of the nation," asserted the editor.^ Troup, 
Congressman from Georgia, in submitting a number of resolutions to the 
House which had as their object the vindication of the commercial rights 
of the United States, declared that it was time that commercial rights of 
hS 
the nation either be exonerated or abandoned. 
The Georgia General Assembly, reflecting the temper of the 
people, made it known to the Madison administration that the citizens of 
Georgia were ready and willing to support the administration in a war 
with Great Britain. Calling for more stringent measures against 
England, the General Assembly in 1809 sent a memorial to the President 
which declared that "we as citizens of Georgia and members of the Union, 
will ever be found in willing readiness to assert and support the rights 
and dignity of our country whenever called upon by the proper authority 
of our National Republic."^ This outpouring of sentiment and support 
indicates that by 1809 the people of Georgia had reached the conclusion 
whereby they believed that further negotiations with England would be 
fruitless, and that the only alternative was war. 
Neither the Madison administration nor the country as a whole was 
ready for war in 1809, however, and Georgians had to wait to "vindicate 
the nation's honor." In the meantime, they turned attention to electing 
an energetic governor who was destined to play an important role in both 
state and national affairs during the early war years. 
^Augusta Mirror, September 18, 1809. 
^bid., December 18, 1809. 
" 
,l 
^Georgia Senate Journal (1809), pp. 106-107. 
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The Georgia General Assembly elected forty-three year old 
David Byrdie Mitchell Governor of Georgia on November 9, 1809# The 
two houses of the legislature, meeting in Joint session, chose Mitchell 
over Jared Irvrin, the incumbent, by a vote of sixty-one to forty-one. 
A more suitable governor could not have been selected to serve during 
this turbulent period. Mitchell, born in 1766, was a native of 
Scotland. He had crossed the Atlantic to claim considerable property in 
and about Savannah which had been willed to him by his maternal uncle. 
Dr. David Byrdie, a well-to-do surgeon in Savannah. V/ithin a short time 
after his arrival in Georgia, the idealistic Scotsman became a law clerk 
and he soon became identified with a group of bright young lawyers in 
Savannah. Mitchell attracted the attention of James Jackson, one of 
the prominent figures in politics in Savannah and the state. Mitchell's 
advice on political and legal matters was sought by Jackson and John 
Milledge. His assiduous attention to military duty and his reputation 
for efficiency resulted in his election to the post of Major General of 
the First Division of the State Militia. Mitchell served in the Georgia 
House of Representatives, he was solicitor-general of the ^astern 
District of the Superior Court, and he served as mayor of Savannah 
from 1801 to 1802.^ In addition, he was an ardent Republican and 
Jeffersonian.^ 
Mitchell's State of the Republic message to the legislature in 
1810 was described as a masterly description of the state of the world 
William Jonathan Northen, editor. Men of Mark of Georgia, 7 Vol¬ 
umes (Atlantas A. D. Caldwell, 1910), II, 183-lHIw 
^Georgia Senate Journal (1810), p. 8. 
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at that time: the intrigues of the European monarchies and their 
effect upon the United States, the embargo and troubles with Great 
Britain and France. He concluded: 
A retrospective view of our relations with these powers will 
however satisfy anyone not blinded by prejudice, that we have 
infinitely more cause of complaint against Great Britain than 
France, notwithstanding the recent unwarrantable and arbitrary 
seizures and confiscation of the property of our merchants by the 
latter power.U9 
Believing that war with Great Britain was inevitable, Jfttchell 
worked diligently to strengthen the military defenses of the state. 
Additional arms and ammunition were procured, fortifications along the 
coast were strengthened, a line of forts was built along the frontier, 
and constant attention was given to strengthening the militia. Despite 
Governor Mitchell's tireless efforts in revamping the militia and 
strengthening what fortifications Georgia possessed, her preparedness 
at this time, however, did not warrant the enthusiastic statement which 
Congressman Bibb made on the floor of the House of Representatives in 
March, 1810. Bibb boasted to his colleagues that "if all the states 
were as ready for war as Georgia is, I would be ready end willing to 
encounter it."^ 
In view of the almost destitute condition of the militia due to 
a lack of sufficient quantity of arms, ammunition, supplies and equip¬ 
ment, Bibb apparently was referring to the psychological preparedness of 
Georgia rather than military. There is little doubt that psychologically, 
^Athens Georgia Express, November 17, 1810; Georgia Senate 
Journal (1810), p. 7. 
^Quoted in Green, "Crawford," p. 32. 
Georgians were perhaps better conditioned for the approaching war than 
many of their fellow citizens in other states, thanks to the strong 
Republican press in the state which had long advocated much more 
stringent measures against EhgLand than Congress was willing to take. 
Yet, despite a strong, militant attitude, Georgia was militarily unpre¬ 
pared for war as Governor Mitchell pointed out in his annual message to 
members of the legislature in November, l8ll. The chief executive 
reminded the lawnakers that war with England was imminent and that the 
state was "almost wholly unprepared to engage in any military enter¬ 
prise, even ... a defensive enterprise."-^ The governor reiterated 
the need for the consideration and adoption of a plan for arming the 
militia. Additional weapons were needed. The cavalry was destitute 
of the necessary equipment to enable it to take to the field should its 
services be required. Many of the cavalry companies were below the 
required strength. Artillery was in the same deplorable condition. 
Mitchell admonished the legislature to take expedient action to put 
the state in readiness for the approaching conflict, pointing out that 
the state stood exposed on every frontier, especially on the coast and 
along the Florida border. 
The legislature promptly responded to the governor's plea for 
preparedness. On November 25, a measure was enacted which provided for 
conformity of the militia laws of Georgia to acts passed by the United 
States Congress with respect to the infantry, artillery, and rifle corps. 
^Georgia Senate Journal (l8ll), p. 11, 
^Ibid., p. 60. 
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An attempt to amend the bill to provide for one week's military train¬ 
ing each year for members of the militia, however, was voted down. 
The lawmakers authorized the governor to purchase six pieces of brass 
ordnances for protection of the sea coast. In addition, the legislature 
passed an act which provided for better organization and equipment for 
53 the cavalry. 
As Georgia made preparations for war, the Federalists in Georgia 
and the nation were denouncing it. The Federalist press of the nation 
redouoled its protests that the fumbling foreign policy of Jefferson, 
dutifully continued by Madison, was pushing the nation into an 
unnecessary war with Great Britain, The Republicans' angry rebuttals 
to those charges resounded in the Augusta Chronicle, the Augusta 
Mirror, the Savannah Republican, the Milledgeville Georgia Journal and 
the Athens Georgia Express. Three papers in the state, the Savannah 
Museum, the Augusta Herald and the Savannah American Patri ot, however, 
braved this barrage of editorial opinion to join, with varying amounts 
of directness and courage, in the Federalist opposition to the threaten¬ 
ing war. 
Of the three, the Savannah American Patriot was the most 
vociferous in denouncing Republicanism and the approaching war. The 
first issue of the semi-weekly American Patriot was published in 
Savannah on April lit, 1812. Its prospectus appeared in late January and 
early February of 1812 in several Georgia newspapers.^ The editors, 
53 Georgia Senate Journal (1811), pp. 53, 90, 97. 
^Savannah Museum, January 30, 1812; Augusta Herald, February 6, 
1812j Savannah Republican, January 28, 1812. 
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John Mitchell and Charles Pratt, promised that the newspaper would seek 
to "further the principles of Washington and Hamilton," a bold declara¬ 
tion for Georgia editors, especially in 1812. It was the cry of national 
Federalism and a warning of an anti-administration policy. 
In his first issue, John Mitchell, referring to the strong pro- 
French sentiment in Georgia, invited trouble when he asserted: "Read, 
Te Windy advocates of FranceI" He attacked President Madison as a 
warmonger and as an incompetent. Of all the "astounding maneuvers" and 
"pitiful Tricks" that had characterized the current administration, the 
editor declared, none was stronger than the president's dealings with 
John Henry, the ex-British agent.^ Other fiery editorials denouncing 
the Republican administration and praising Federalism poured from the 
pen of Mitchell. Boldly he quoted the Baltimore Federal Republican 
on the nation's need of a stronger navy before it dared threaten mighty 
Britain. He gave unstinted praise to a recent speech on the crisis by 
Josiah Quincy, a leading New Ehgland Federalist. Furthermore, he 
expressed delight that the federal government was having difficulty in 
obtaining an eleven million dollar loan from the states with which to con¬ 
duct the war.^ 
5£After the Chesapeake affair, John Henry had been sent by Sir 
James Craig, Governor-General of Canada, to find out the attitudes of the 
New Etoglanders. Henry went to Boston, the seat of Federalism, and kept 
\ip a lively correspondence with Sir James. Upon completion of his assign¬ 
ment he asked for but was refused compensation for his services. As a 
result, Henry sold his correspondence to the United States government for 
$56,000. On March 9, 1812, President Madison forwarded the letters to 
Congress along with a statement in which he charged that the British 
government had been guilty of the high crime of sending an agent to foment 
disaffection against the constituted authorities of the nation. Reginald 
Horsman, The Causes of the War of 1812 (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 15*62), pp. 5II2-2U3. 
^Savannah American Patriot, May 19, 1812. 
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Even the foolhardy Mitchell must have been satisfied with the 
outrage he provoked. Anonymous letters condemning the editor and 
recommending that he be used as "an object on irtiich to exercise the 
body" poured into the war-rdnded Republican until its editor, John 
^7 
Evans, had to apologize for a lack of space necessary to publish all. 
Mitchell announced on April 2h that anonymous letters, some 
threatening physical violence, had poured into his office. Scornfully 
he dared his enemies to come into the open. However, realizing his 
danger, Mitchell took the precaution of arming himself with two pistols. 
Nonetheless, he persisted, attempting to make himself heard above the 
clamor for war. On May 20, the city council of Savannah called a public 
meeting to discuss the gravity of the nation's problem. The citizens 
convened on June 3> heard several resolutions supporting a firmer stand 
against England, and one favoring the invasion of Florida, and passed 
them all. 
In the Patriot on June 5, Mitchell charged that the resolution 
favoring an invasion of Florida would have been voted down but for the 
parliamentary trickery of the presiding chairman, Mayor William Bulloch. 
When the Federalists on the committee offered an alternate set of 
resolutions which omitted any sanction of the Florida invasion, Bulloch 
called for a voice vote on whether the minority's resolutions should be 
considered, and promptly ruled that the audience had voted in the 
^Savannah Republican, April 21, 28, May 2, 12, 1812. 
^Broadside, June 6, 1812, addressed to "The Free Impartial and 
Unbiased Citizens of Savannah," in Georgia Historical Society, Savannah. 
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negative. Mitchell insisted that a count of hands would have earned 
a hearing for the second set of resolutions. 
The belligerent patriots of Savannah decided that they had 
endured enough. That night a mob broke into Mitchell's house. The 
editor described the outrage in a pamphlet issued on the following 
day.-7 He had been warned the previous day that he might expect 
uninvited guests in the evening. Although he was aware of the possible 
danger, he refused to do more than place two pistols on a table near 
the chair in which he sat awaiting his unwelcomed visitors. Suddenly 
he heard footsteps upon his stairs, and "two fellows, one by the name of 
Pitcher, the other an Irishman, a Tavern-Stewart & Billiard Marker by 
the name of Burke" burst into the room. 
I seized the pistols, cocked them, and demanded their business— 
they equivocated and shuffled upon my telling them to stand off or 
I would fire ... others of their brutal comrades appeared. . . . 
My attention was for a moment distracted, and T felt a repugnance at 
shedding the blood of a fellow-creature, until compelled by necessity; 
my left arm was seized and one pistol wrestled from me; I presented 
the other to the breast of one of the gang, which flashed—I was 
thus disarmed and surrounded by several strong-bodied men, who with 
heavy clubs struck me with such violence over my face and uncovered 
head that, it was my impression at the moment, they intended committing 
murder."0 
His cries for help brought his partner to the scene, but Pratt, 
after firing one shot which missed, elected to depart in search of 
assistance. In seething anger Mitchell recounted the brutality and 
humiliation which followed: 
^Broadside, June 6, 1812, addressed to "The Free Impartial and 
Unbiased Citizens of Savannah," in Georgia Historical Society, Savannah. 
^Ibid. 
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The degenerated cowards, not content with bruising, must drag me 
out of my dwelling into the street, where I was surrounded by a 
large mob, the very filthy dregs of Democracy, who hurried me 
along with blows, to an adjoining pump, where they gratified their 
hellish malice. 
Supporters finally came to his rrscue. He thanked them and assured than 
that the disgraceful violence he had suffered would only spur him to 
greater efforts of patriotism. His defiant pledge, however, was never 
carried out. On June 8, he issued another broadside which announced 
that the American Patriot had been discontinued and the firm of Mitchell 
6l 
and Pratt dissolved. 
Georgian^ contempt of Federalism was exceeded only by their hatred 
of the "haughty" British. Though the French were perhaps as guilty as 
the Baglish in obstructing the trade of the United States, it was the 
latter who came in for the state's anathema. The editor of the Savannah 
Republican, pointing to the wrongs that the United States had suffered 
at the hands of the British, askedt "Do not the acts of glaring 
oppression of each succeeding day call loudly for vengeance? 
"Georgia," writing in the Augusta Mirror, issued a call to arms by 
declaring that it "seems to be universally admitted that war or submission 
are the only alternatives left us—why then hesitatel" He urged: "Arise 
ye sons of freedom, to arms! to arms! and like your fore-fathers, swear 
to never lay them down until the haughty British shall again consent to 
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do us Justice." In much the same tone, the editor of the Georgia 
— m 
^Broadside, June 8, 1812, addressed "To the Public," in Georgia 
Historical Society, Savannah. 
^Savannah Republican, January 23, 1812. 
^Augusta Mirror, February 17, 1812. 
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Express announced that the time had arrived for the country to vindicate 
its honor. "If the impressment of near 7000 of our citizens," the 
editor asserted, "is not deemed sufficient cause for war, against that 
perfidious nation—the late attanpt to sever our Union thro' the agency 
of J. Henry and others ... would be sufficient cause for us to wage 
war. . . 
Georgians assembled in mass meetings throughout the state in the 
spring of 1812, and adopted and forwarded resolutions to Congress 
demanding war be declared against Great Britain. At such a meeting on 
June 3 in Savannah, the citizens approved a resolution which declared 
that the nation had abundant cause for war against both France and 
Great Britain, but "it is demanded against Great Britain. 
Savannahians further approved the strong attitude which Congress had 
recently adopted against Great Britain, and pledged their lives and 
fortunes in support of the government. Citizens of Milledgeville were 
of the opinion that Congress had been dragging its feet. On June 13, 
five days before the declaration of war, a group of citizens met and 
registered their disapproval of the tardy measures of the federal 
government. They recommended an immediate declaration of war against 
Ehgland and the issuance of Letters of Marque and Reprisal against both 
France and England.^ 
^Athens Georgia Express, May 29, 1812. 
^Savannah Republican, June It, 1812. 
^Athens Georgia Express, June 26, 1812 
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No doubt this aggressive attitude on the part of Georgians met 
the full approbation of the "Warhavks" in Congress. This group of new, 
young members made their appearance in the Twelfth Congress in 1811. The 
war party, composed of western men and "radical, expansionists, malcontent 
politicians of the east"^ famd itself in full control when Congress 
met. Thirty-four year old Henry Clay of Kentucky, the most prominent 
of the "Warhawks," came to the House of Representatives, where he was at 
once chosen speaker. Clay was supported in his warlike policy by Peter 
Buell Porter of New York and John Adams Harper of New Hampshire, and by 
almost the entire delegation of the western states. Thomas Worthington 
of Ohio and John Pope of Kentucky, both in the Senate, were the only 
important exceptions. In addition, a fair portion of the members from 
Pennsylvania, Virginia and North Carolina joined the young radicals. 
These Republicans were joined by twenty-nine year old John Caldwell 
Calhoun, Langdon Cheves and William Lowndes from South Carolina, and 
68 by William Harris Crawford and George Michael Troup from Georgia. 
These young men, representing agrarian interests in the South and West, 
were not only smarting under the insults heaped upon the country by 
EhgLand and France, but were "eager to snatch Florida and Canada from 
Spain and Phgland."^ Public opinion, they believed, demanded war and 
they were anxious to give the public what it desired. 
^Julius William Pratt, Expansionists of 1812 (Gloucester, 
Massachusetts: The Macmillan Company, 1925), p. U8. (Hereinafter cited 
as Pratt, Expansionists.) 
68D. R. Anderson, "The Insurgents of 1811," Report of the American 
Historical Association, 2 Volumes (1911), I, 167. 
^Pratt, Expansionists, p. U8. 
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These men, and others who joined them, were of a wholly different 
generation of Republicans from Jefferson, Madison and Monroe. They 
were impatient with the older statesmen and their methods. They deplored 
the bewildering method in which the Tenth and Eleventh Congresses had 
conducted the affairs of the government. From 180? until 1812, the 
national legislature, along with the president, in opposition to the war 
movement, looked around for convenient substitutions. Congress, in its 
vacillating way, avoided war, adopted an embargo; surrendered the embargo; 
accepted non-intercourse, abandoned non-intercourse; finally fell upon 
the humiliating Macon Bill No. 2.^ 
Serving in the Twelfth Congress from Georgia were William Bibb, 
Howell Cobb, Boiling Hall and George Michael Troup. William Harris 
Crawford and Charles Tait held seats in the Senate. Although Georgia's 
Congressmen did not always agree politically on all measures of the 
Republican administration, they did, however, vote unanimously for 
measures designed to prepare the nation for war. Their uniform voting 
on military matters earned the approval of the editor of the Augusta 
Chronicle who declared that: 
The citizens of Georgia will observe with pride and satisfaction, 
the course pursued by their representatives, through this trying 
and difficult crisis; having maturely formed their opinion on 
public measures, they have pursued with zeal and uniformity like 
statesmen and patriots, the only course which was left for the 
preservation of their country's rights and honor.71 
^This bill restored trade with all the world but offered to 
renew non-intercourse against Thgland if France repealed her decrees. 
Likewise, if England would repeal her decrees, the United States would 
restore non-intercourse against France. Annals of Congress, 11 Cong., 
1 and 2 sess., II, 7SU-7#, 1930-1931. 
"^■Augusta Chronicle, March 20, 1812. 
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The state of Georgia was fortunate in that she was represented 
during the frustrating years from 1808 to 1812 by such able congressmen 
as Crawford, Troup and Bibb. These individuals appear to be the only 
members of the Georgia delegation who took an active part in the 
congressional debates. Bibb and Trouo often took the floor in the 
House of Representatives to expound their views, but there is little 
record of either Cobb, Hall or Smelt speaking out on any issue. In the 
Senate, Crawford was the spokesman for Georgia. Although he was one of 
the most zealous and powerful advocates of war with Great Britain, upon 
the disability of Vice-President George Clinton in March, 1812, 
Crawford was chosen president pro tempore of the Senate, thereby making 
him ineligible for active participation on the floor. Although Crawford 
could not speak in favor of war, he could vote for it, which he did when 
the opportunity presented itself. 
The opportunity came in the spring of 1812. James Madison, 
Tinder pressure from Congress and Cabinet alike, sent a war message to 
Congress on June 1. The House of Representatives quickly passed a 
bill declaring war on Great Britain on June U by a vote of seventy-nine 
to forty-nine. The Senate, after several days debate, passed the declara¬ 
tion on June 17 by a vote of nineteen to thirteen. Georgia's congressional 
delegation in both houses voted unanimously for war. On June 18, 1812, 
the United States was officially at war with Great Britain. 
Throughout Georgia, newspapers broke the story with patriotic 
fervor. On June 25, the editor of the Savannah Republican announced 
triumphantly that the nation was at war with Great Britain. The Augusta 
Chronicle brought out an extra on Saturday, June 26. The Athens Express 
headed its announcement with the single word "WAR" set in large caps. 
Even the editor of the lukewarm Augusta Herald had already prepared for 
the inevitable by declaring on June 18 that "our rights must be 
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respected by both belligerents." Editors urged their readers to meet 
with vigor and confidence this threat to the infant Union. 
Patriotism from 1808 until the declaration of war was never 
lacking in Georgia. In analyzing this patriotism, one wonders at the 
paradox he finds. If the real grievances which caused the war were 
interference by Great Britain with American commerce and the rights of 
American sailors, why was Georgia, a state scarcely affected, so enthusi¬ 
astic for war? England was not injuring Georgians directly, for they 
were not engaged in the carrying trade. The searching of a New England 
ship and the removal of sailors was no loss to Georgians. Yet, they 
ardently supported measures tfiich were detrimental to the state as a 
whole, bringing the trading economy to a condition of almost total ruin. 
The people of Georgia suffered many privations, including bankruptcy, 
loss of markets and exorbitant prices, yet they continued to express 
patriotism for the measures which heaped ruin on them. 
The enthusiasm of Georgians for war, however, was not measured 
alone by the indignation they felt at the insults Britain had heaped 
upon the United States nor because of any compassion they might have 
felt for the New BigLand shippers, despoiled of their vessels. The 
people of Georgia had a more immediate interest **iich touched them 
closely, the Spanish owned territory of Florida and it was this desire 
for annexation of lands on Georgia's southern border that prompted the 
enthusiastic support for the ensuing conflict. 
72Augusta Herald, June 18, 1812. 
CHAPTER II 
SPANISH FLORIDA! THE EMBRYO OF MANIFEST DESTINY 
In a war with Great Britain the people of Georgia saw an oppor¬ 
tunity to press for the annexation of Florida. They were convinced that 
if war were declared against England, the United States government 
would seize the territory from Ehgland's ally, Spain, in order to orevent 
the British from establishing military bases in Florida.^" 
Georgia's interest in Florida stemmed from early colonial times. 
Founded in 1732 as a buffer colony against the Spanish in Florida and 
as a refuge for debtors, Georgia from its beginning was constantly 
harassed by the unruly inhabitants of Spanish Florida. Even when Spain 
ceded the province to Ehgland in 1763, the situation did not improve. 
The unsavory characters who inhabited the once Spanish territory con¬ 
tinued to be a constant threat to the peace and safety of Georgia, and 
in her attempts to end this menace, Georgia's efforts to capture Saint 
Augustine almost became a habit. 
During the Revolution, the British used Florida as a base from 
which to organize raids against Georgia. In the peace settlement in 
^■Journal of the Senate of the General Assembly of Georgia (1812), 
p. 9. (Hereinafter cited as Georgia Senate Journal.) "See Governor 
David Byrdie Mitchell's address to the General Assembly. The governor, 
in reporting his activities in Florida as a representative of the 
federal government in the spring of 1012, stated that the "confidence 
with which I anticipated the declaration of war against Great Britain led 
me with equal confidence to anticipate an enlargement of the powers of 
the president by Congress as a necessary consequence, having for object 
the entire occupancy of the provinces of East and West Florida." 
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1783, Qigland ceded the territory back to Spain. Florida became a 
refuge for Tories, driven out of Georgia, who contributed to the 
ill-will existing between the Spanish colony and the State of Georgia. 
The east and west coasts of Florida furnished a haven for a host of 
smugglers and pirates. The lawless from land and sea flocked to these 
shores. Fugitive slaves from Georgia found relief from their enforced 
laborj and in alliance with hostile Indians, they found it easy to 
pillage the Georgia frontiers.^ Georgians living along the southern 
border suffered constant depredations from these miscreants, tfio crossed 
the border into Georgia, committed murder, stole livestock and Negro 
slaves, burned dwellings, and then quickly made their escape back into 
Spanish-owned territory.^ These forays furnished a strong inducement 
2 
'The peace settlement led to a boundary dispute between the 
United States and Spain. In her settlement with Spain, Great Britain 
gave back Florida with the Atlantic and the Mississippi as its eastern 
and western limits but with no precise definition of its northern 
boundary. In the preliminary treaty with the United States, however, 
Great Britain had agreed secretly that, if she were to keep Florida, 
its boundary would be set at latitude 32 degrees 28 minutes and that, 
if she ceded it to Spain, its boundary would be located farther south, 
at the thirty-first parallel. Afterwards the United States insisted 
upon the more southerly of these lines, but Spain demanded the additional 
northern strip as rightfully a part of Florida. Spain also claimed 
extensive territory even north of that, as belonging to her by virtue 
of successful military operations against the British during the 
Revolution. Thomas Anderson Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American 
People (New York! Appleton-Century-Crofts Publishing Company, l%h), p. 
59. (Hereinafter cited as Bailey, Diplomatic History.) 
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Allen Daniel Candler, editor. The Revolutionary Records of the 
State of Georgia, 3 Volumes (Atlanta! The Franklin-Turner Company, 1969), 
17100^03. 
^Lilla M. Hawes, editor, "The Letter Book of General James 
Jackson, 1788-1796," Collections of the Georgia Historical Society, XI 
(1955)» provides an excellent description of the Indian menace along the 
south Georgia border; the Florida-Georgia Affairs File, in Georgia Depart¬ 
ment of Archives and History, Atlanta, contains correspondence relating 
to depredations on the Georgia-Florida border. 
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for retaliation, and when the Spanish authorities refused to put an end 
to these practices, many Georgians crossed into East Florida, boldly 
rounded up their slaves and other property stolen by marauders, and 
returned them to Georgia. 
Not only did the people of Georgia wish to end the Spanish menace 
in Florida, but equally important in their ardor for the territory was 
the desire for rich plantation lands and water transportation outlets to 
the Gulf of Mexico. It was this fact that prompted the Creek Indian 
Chief, Alexander McGillivray, to write Estevan Miro, the Spanish Gover¬ 
nor at New Orleans, in 1789, that 
the wishes & Intentions of the Georgians are well known to be these 
first to compel us to a concession of all the territory which they 
want from us, a part of which cuts deep into East Florida, their 
Second object is to force our trade from its present channel the 
Floridas into their own hands which will at once make them our 
dictators in all matters.5 
Leaders in the Jefferson administration were well aware of the 
public opinion of Georgia on the Florida question. In 1803, a 
committee from the United States House of Representatives investigated 
the feasibility of acquiring the province. The committee pointed out 
the advantages of annexing East Florida in a renortl 
From its junction with the State of Georgia at the river St. Mary's 
it stretches nearly four hundred miles into the sea, forming a 
large peninsula and has some very fine harbors. The southern 
point. Cape Florida, is not more than one hundred miles from the 
Havana, and the possession of it may be beneficial to us in rela¬ 
tion to our trade with the West Indies. It would likewise make our 
whole territory compact, would add considerably to our sea coast. 
^Alexander McGillivray to Estevan Miro, June 2h, 1789, in John 
'•Jalton Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1938), p. 239. 
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and by giving ns the Gulf of Mexico, for our southern boundary, 
would render us less liable to attack in what is deemed the 
most vulnerable part of the Union." 
The report concluded, "If we look forward to the free use of the 
Mississippi, the Mobile, the Appalchola /sic/, and the other rivers of 
the west, by ourselves and our posterity, New Orleans and the Floridas 
must become a part of the U. States, either by purchase or by con¬ 
quest."^ 
Spain refused to sell the Floridas, but in 1803, Napoleon, claim¬ 
ing that Spain had ceded West Florida to France by the Treaty of San 
Ildefonso in 1800, included the province in the Louisiana Purchase. 
Spain protested vigorously, denying that any of Florida was part of 
g 
Louisiana. All things considered, the title to West Florida was 
highly questionable. Nevertheless, Ajuericans, undaunted by Spain's 
remonstrances, claimed territory to the Perdido River as part of the 
Louisiana Purchase. To this questionable claim to West Florida was 
presently added a claim to East Florida as payment for injuries 
occasioned by "conduct unbecoming a neutral" during the period of 
^Annals of Congress, 7 Cong., 2 sess., II, 371-37U. 
Tlbld. 
Q 
Napoleon had obtained the territory from Spain on the condition 
that he deliver Tuscany to the son-in-law of Charles IV. Bonaparte never 
completely fulfilled this promise, though solemnly bound to return 
Louisiana if he failed to do so. In addition, Spain had secured from 
Napoleon a written pledge that Louisiana would never be handed over to 
a third nation. Bailey, Diplomatic History, p. 112. 
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hostilities between the United States and France, the so-called 
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spoliation claims. But Spain refused to negotiate. 
The settlers of West Florida, a majority of whom were Americans 
who had taken possession of farming land in the Spanish province, did 
not share the sentiments of Spain. Chafing under Spain's corrupt rule, 
in September, 1810, the citizens of the Baton Rouge district of West 
Florida, encouraged by the United States government, revolted against 
Spanish rule. Raising a flag with a single star, they declared the 
district to be an independent state and appealed to the United States 
government for aid and protection. The independence was short-lived. 
The government in Washington quickly claimed the district as part of 
the Louisiana purchase and sent troops to enforce the claim. 
Although the Georgia press made few references to the desirability 
of annexing Florida until the Spring of 1812 when war with Fngland was 
a certainty, the desire for the Spanish territory, nevertheless, strongly 
existed.^ This lack of reference probably was due to the fact that the 
^Secretary of State James Monroe to Augustus Foster, November 2, 
1811, in Annals of Congress, 12 Cong., 1 sess., Appendix, Ii39-Ut05 see 
also Julius William Pratt, "James Monroe," The American Secretaries of 
State and Their Diplomacy, 15 Volumes. Edited by Samuel Flagg Bemis 
(various publishers, 1928-1966), in, b8. (Hereinafter cited as Pratt, 
"Monroe.") American citizens held claims against Spain, based upon 
seizures, beginning in 1796, of about 125 vessels and cargoes. In 
addition, French vessels had made seizures within Spanish jurisdiction 
and French consuls in Spanish ports had condemned American vessels. 
^Francis F. Beime, The War of 1812 (Hamden, Connecticut: Anchor 
Books, 1965), p. 82. 
■^From 1808 to 1812, only three references were found which 
expressed the desirability of annexing the Floridas. All were found in 
the Milledgeville Georgia Journal, July 25, September 12, 1810, 
January 30, l8ll. 
hh 
people of Georgia did not wish to encourage further the opposition of 
New Fhglanders against a war with Great Britain. Merchants in the 
maritime states, despite British commercial restrictions, still found 
it profitable to engage in the shipping trade. One contemporary source 
estimated that if only one vessel in three escaped capture the owner came 
out ahead. Under this circumstance, it is no surprise that New ^glanders 
opposed the war movement, preferring instead to risk the loss of their 
ships and merchandise in return for high profits. Georgia citizens, 
aware of the attitudes of the New Qiglanders, did not wish to openly 
express their real intentions for advocating war. Rather, until the 
war psychosis was fairly general, most Georgians endorsed a positive 
stand against England to protect the "national honor," "rights of 
neutrals" and "sailors* rights." 
The first Georgia newspaper editor to express sentiments favor¬ 
ing the acquisition of Florida and thus introducing the "expansionist" 
idea as a cause for war was the editor of the Milledgeville Georgia 
Journal. In the summer of 1810, the Journal's editor drew readers' 
attention to the importance of the Spanish province to the nation and 
to Georgia. It is in the interest of the United States, the editor said, 
to take Florida under its protection. The Mississippi, Mobile, Sipsey's, 
Tombigbee, Alabama, Chattahoochee, Apalachicola and other southern 
rivers hold the key to western navigation. Consequently, the interest 
of Georgia and Tennessee, together with that of the Territories of 
Mississippi, Orleans and Indiana, was essentially interwoven with the 
possession of Florida. 
U5 
In addition, Florida was valuable for other reasons, according 
to the editor. The province contained a diversity of soils, ideal for 
growing a variety of crops and timber. Furthermore, exports from 
Pensacola alone during British possession from 1763 to 1783 amounted 
to over 63,OCX) pounds annually, and imports from Great Britain during 
this same period were valued at 97,000 pounds annually. 
If these economic reasons were not sufficient to rouse expansionist- 
minded Georgians, the Journal's pungent editorial a few weeks later 
brought a militant reaction from readers. Did not Florida provide a 
sanctuary for Indians and criminals, the editor asked, who made life 
hazardous on Georgia's southern frontier? Had not the "pusillanimous 
Spaniards" refused to do Georgians justice? Not only did they stand 
idly by while Georgia's border was ravaged by these degenerate characters, 
but they further encouraged such forays.1-^ A host of Georgia citizens 
agreed with the editor for they were all too familiar with this menace. 
They could never feel secure as long as this situation existed. The 
solution for ending this threat, as Georgians viewed it, was simple: 
subjugation of the province by United States troops. 
George Mathews, ex-governor of Georgia, and well acquainted with 
public opinion in Georgia on the Florida question, urged William Harris 
Crawford, Senator from Georgia, to use his influence in Washington to 
convince the federal authorities of the necessity of acquiring the 
Spanish colony. Crawford needed no prodding. For some time he had 
l^toilledgeville Georgia Journal, July 25, 1810. 
^Ibid., September 12, 1810. 
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been interested in the cession of the Floridas and frequently expressed 
his views to the administration leaders in Washington. Crawford 
believed it necessary to the prosperity of Georgia that this territory 
be annexed by the United States, and he worked diligently to promote 
the permanent occupation of the province 
A rapid succession of events in 1810 provided the conditions for 
such action. Napoleon conquered Spain, the Spanish royal family fled and 
Great Bid.tain began to exhibit an alarmingly solicitous attitude toward 
his Catholic Majesty, the King of Spain. Alarmed over the possibility 
that Great Britain might use the Spanish foothold in the Floridas from 
which to launch an attack on the United States, Congress in secret 
session passed an act on January 15, 1811, authorizing the president to 
take possession of all or any part of the Perdido River unon either of 
two conditions: first, if any agreement for such occupation could be 
reached with the local authorities; second, "in the event of an attempt 
to occupy said territory, or any part thereof, by any foreign govern¬ 
ment."^ The act further authorized the president to use the army and 
ikphilip Jackson Green, "The Public Life of William Harris 
Crawford, 1807-1825" (University of Chicago, 1935), pp. IiO, Ulj. An 
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. (Hereinafter cited as Green, "Public 
Life of Crawford.") 
15 Annals of Congress, 11 Cong., 3 sess., II, 112U, 1126, 1127, 
1138, 1251-1252,~T259. The act resulted partly from an offer of Governor 
Vincent Folch of West Florida in which he stated that unless re-enforced 
by his government before January 1, 1811, he would turn over his terri¬ 
tory to the United States; and partly from a widespread belief that 
England had designs upon the Floridas and would likely seize them if 
the United States did not. 
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navy of the United States to effect the occnpation and provided that any 
territory so occupied should be considered as subject to future negotia¬ 
tion. 
Under the provisions of the secret act. President Madison appointed 
Mathews and Colonel John McKee, Indian Agent, to act as agents or 
commissioners on behalf of the United States to carry it into effect. 
Summoned to Washington, they received written orders on January 26 from 
the Secretary of State. Their instructions directed them to "repair to 
that quarter with all possible expedition, concealing from general 
observations the trust committed to you, with that discretion which the 
delicacy and importance of the undertaking require. The conduct you are 
to pursue in regard to East Florida," Mathews and McKee were instructed, 
"must be regulated by the dictate of your own judgment, based on accurate 
knowledge of the situation and of the real disposition of the Spanish 
government, always recurring to the present instructions as the paramount 
rule of your proceedings." Their instructions further stated: 
Should you discover an inclination in the governor of East Florida, 
or in the existing local authority, amicably to surrender that 
province into the possession of the U.S., you are to accept it on 
the same terms that are prescribed by these instructions in rela¬ 
tion to West Florida. And in case of the actual appearance of any 
attempt to take possession by a foreign power, you will /pre¬ 
occupy the territory and exclude the foreign force/. 
Mathews' first assignment under the act of January 15, 1811, was 
to confer with Vincente Folch, the Spanish executive in West Florida, 
on the possibility of driivering that province to the United States. 
l^James Daniel Richardson, editor, A Compilation of the Messages 
and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1921, 3$ Volumes tNewTorTTT Bureau 
of National Literature, 1897-1921, II, h91-U92. 
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The general's conferences in Mobile failed, the Spanish governor refused 
to follow through on a previous conditional offer to turn over the 
17 province to the United States. Mathews next turned attention to 
East Florida under the vague and elastic powers granted in his instruc¬ 
tions. He proceeded to Saint Marys, Georgia, located near the Florida 
border, and engineered a mock rebellion among the residents living south 
of the Saint Marys River, many of whom were former Georgians. These 
rebellious individuals, including "a few dozen Spanish subjects," fled 
the Spanish rule of East Florida and joined forces with volunteers from 
T R Georgia and Tennessee to form what they called the "Patriot Group." 
The Patriots, believing that their future would be more secure as 
American citizens, wished to exchange Spanish rule for that of the 
United States. 
With the promise of American military assistance and other 
encouragement extended by General Mathews, the Patriots we^e eager to 
assist in wrestling East Florida from Spain. As such they provided 
one of the contingencies stipulated in the secret act of 1811 under 
which Mathews was to operate. This act specifically authorized the 
president to take possession of the territory of Florida "in case an 
arrangement has been or shall be made with the local authority." 
^Ralph Isaacs to George Mathews and John McKee, March 31, 1811, 
in Clarence Edwin Carter, editor, The Territorial Papers of the United 
States, 178l-l8U5j 26 Volumes (Washington: Government Printing Office. 
193U-1963, VI, 188-189. Folch had previously offered to hand over West 
Florida to the United States if he were not re-enforced by January 1, 
1811. His desperate situation, however, had been relieved by the 
Spanish government. 
l8Pratt, "Monroe," III, 237, 2ia. 
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However, when Mathews arrived in East Florida he proceeded to establish 
the local authority he desired. On March 18, 1812, with the aid of the 
United States fleet, which had been ordered to Saint Marys, Mathews 
and the Patriots crossed the Saint Marys River into Florida, raised a 
flag on Amelia Island, and issued a declaration of independence. 
Two weeks later, re-enforced by United States troops, they enthusi¬ 
astically inarched on to capture Saint 'ugustine, the Spanish capital. 
Here the offensive faltered. The revolution had failed to attract a 
sufficient number of revolutionists to take the Spanish stronghold, 
and the conunander of the United States troops refused to take part in 
offensive operations against the impregnable fort. Although Mathews 
bombarded Washington with correspondence seeking information as to 
what his course of action should be and asking for re-enforcements, his 
letters went unanswered. Unable to obtain a response from the federal 
government, Mathews turned to Georgia for assistance. 
David Byrdie Mitchell, who was re-elected Governor of Georgia 
on November 7, 1811, kept an anxious eye on the developments south of 
the Georgia border.^® He hoped that the United States government 
would occupy East Florida and thereby relieve Georgia of her are old 
problem of dealing with the Spaniards. With Florida in the possession 
of the United States, Georgia would be relieved of the Indian problem 
^•^Milledgeville Georgia Journal, April 1, l8l2| Pratt, "Monroe," 
III, 21a. 
Governor David Byrdie Mitchell to General John Floyd, March 29, 
1812, in Governor's Letter Book A, 1809-181U, pp. 57-58, Georgia Depart¬ 
ment of Archives and History, Atlanta. (Hereinafter cited as Letter 
Book A.) 
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along her southern frontier, new lands could be acquired and new 
transportation witlets to the Gulf of Mexico could be opened. 
Mitchell was prepared to offer any assistance to the federal 
government to accomplish these goals. Upon notification by Major General 
John Floyd, Connander of the South Georgia Militia, that a revolution 
in East Florida was imminent, the governor issued general orders on 
March 18, 1812, to the effect that Georgia would render assistance to 
those acting in behalf of the United States government. The chief 
executive then ordered Floyd to hold his militia in readiness, and 
further, to act upon any overture for assistance if sought by any 
officer or agent of the United States.^" 
Even though he was prepared to render any aid necessary, 
Mitchell was dubious of the whole scheme to take the Floridas. In a 
letter to General Floyd, he wrote: 
Before I proceed to answer your particular inquiries respecting 
the militia service, I take liberty of making some observations 
on the situation of parties engaged in the revolution in East 
Florida. It is a matter not only of great surprise, but of real 
regret that the United States should so manage their affairs 
that, in so important a transaction as the occupancy of a province 
belonging to a friendly foreign power their agent and officers 
should be left with such positive instruct:ons as would leave no 
doubt of the conduct they were to pursue. . . .22 
Mitchell proceeded in his letter to point out the precarious position 
of the Patriots who ventured to oppose the regular government of the 
Spanish province in case they did not succeed. "They had entered the 
21 Minutes of the Executive Department of Georgia, January 1, 1811- 
September 30, 1812, pp. 319-320, Georgia Department of Archives and History, 
Atlanta. 
22 Governor David Byrdie Mitchell to General John Floyd, March 29, 
1812, in Letter Book A, pp. 57-58. 
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undertaking," he said, "with assurance of the United States commissioner 
of immediate and effectual support; and at the moment of their first 
attempt they were left without the smallest assistance." He further told 
Floyd: 
Either the commissioner has exceeded his authority or the United 
States have deluded those people, and in either case the consequence 
to them are the same. For the honor of the country, I hope the 
agent has pledged the government without authority. For myself as 
chief magistrate of the state, I cannot help saying that the silence 
of the general government upon this subject is unaccountable. . . .23 
Mitchell had not been surprised by the revolt in East Florida. 
No doubt he had been aoprised of the government's decision to occupy 
the province by his close friend, William Harris Crawford. What irri¬ 
tated the governor, however, was the fact the federal government had not 
informed him as to when the revolution would occur. Since Georgia's 
frontier bordered on the Spanish province, he felt that he should have 
been informed so that he could have placed the state militia in readiness. 
Furthermore, the chief executive knew that should the revolution be 
unsuccessful, the Spanish governor would prescribe retaliatory measures 
on the American settlers, the majority of whom were former residents of 
Georgia. 
The federal government's continued silence on the Florida 
situation left the Governor of Georgia in a dilemma. If he called out 
the militia to assist the Patriots in Fast Florida without authority of 
the president, he would be violating the Constitution which prohibited 
state governments from engaging in military operations except for the 
purpose of suppressing an insurrection or when expecting an invasion or 
^Governor David Byrdie Mitchell to General John Floyd, March 29, 
1812, in Letter Book A, up. 57-58. 
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when called upon by the federal government. Yet, in the event he did 
violate the Constitution and called out the militia, all expenses would 
have to be met by the state, even if the service performed were one 
which should be discharged by the federal government. In view of the 
condition of the treasury and the inadequate equipment of the militia, 
Georgia could ill-afford to furnish troops to East Florida at state 
expense. 
With the United States government remaining mute on the role 
Georgia might play in regard to East Florida, Mitchell apparently had 
reached the decision to send Georgia militia to the province if the 
Patriots could not subdue Saint Augustine, and if the commander of the 
United States troops continued to refuse aid, "I shall consider our 
situation so critical a one," he told Floyd, "that you will inform me of 
the fact immediately and I shall adapt such measures as are in my power 
to guard against the consequences of such an event whether I have any 
communication with the Government or not."^^ 
Meanwhile, Mathews, unable to dislodge the Spanish at Saint 
Augustine, made repeated requests for additional troops from Georgia. 
On April 6, 1812, he informed Benjamin Hawkins, United States Indian 
Agent, that the rebels besieging the fort were desperate for supplies. 
He begged Hawkins to do what he could to obtain re-enforcements from 
Georgia.^ Simultaneously, he requested 250 men from General Floyd. 
^^Governor David Byrdie Mitchell to General John Floyd, March 29, 
1812, in Letter Book A, pp. 57-58. 
^Benjamin Hawkins to Governor David Byrdie Mitchell, April 6, 
1812, in Letters of Benjamin Hawkins, 1797-l8l5, p. 152, Georgia 
Department of Archives and Histoiy, Atlanta. 
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In early April, William Harris Crawford apprised Mitchell of 
the federal government's position in regard to East Florida. Crawford 
informed the governor that Mathews had exceeded his instructions. Under 
this circumstance, Mitchell, although he countenanced Mathews' efforts, 
knew that it was beyond his constitutional power to send troops to aid 
the Patriots. The chief executive informed Floyd of this fact, at the 
same time cautioning him that in the future, if Mathews requested 
troops, his request must be buttressed by some additional authority. 
The governor then laid plans for the protection of the southern frontier. 
He ordered Floyd to place a contingency of troops along the southern 
border. While he still hoped that the federal government would call 
upon the state for aid, he made known the fact that he had not abandoned 
the idea of independent state action. "The fate of Augustine," he 
told Floyd, "will decide the course which I shall pursue if left without 
a call from the federal government.'^ 
With the government remaining silent as to its ultimate aim in 
East Florida and with Mathews unable to subdue Saint Augustine, Georgia's 
situation became more precarious. Finally, afraid to wait any longer 
on official word from Washington, Governor Mitchell wrote the Secretary 
of War, William Eustis, on April 20, stating that the situation in East 
Florida was critical and that some action had to be taken. The Georgia 
volunteers were restless and their battles with the sand flies and 
mosquitoes had caused many to desert and return to their homes. He 
further informed the Secretary: "You must be sensible how extremely 
^Governor David Byrdie Mitchell to General John Floyd, April 16, 
1812, in Letter Book A, pp. 61-62. 
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vulnerable the frontier of Georgia is upon the St. Mary's, nor can it 
be necessary for me to detail the causes which make it so, they are 
generally known." He expressed fears that if Saint Augustine were not 
taken, and if additional Spanish troops arrived, retaliation might be 
directed against Georgia. In view of the dangerous and critical situa¬ 
tion in which Georgia was placed, Mitchell requested permission to call 
out the militia. He concluded his letter: "A prompt and decisive course 
in regard to E. Florida has become indispensable in my estimation, not 
only for the safety of Georgia but for the honor and interest of the 
Union.Before Mitchell's letter reached the Secretary of War, the 
Madison administration had decided on a course of action. News had 
reached Washington of startling events in East Florida. 
Although the federal government, by its silence for several 
months, had lent tacit approval to Mathews' plans, it was expedient at 
this time to repudiate them. The government had been willing to 
countenance secret contrivances to bring about the occupation of Fast 
Florida, but it had not been prepared for Mathews' open and flagrant use 
of armed forces against a foreign power. In addition, the publication 
at this time of the Henry letters which showed that Great Britain had 
apparently conspired with leading Federalists to bring about the dis¬ 
memberment of the Union, and the accompanying Republican denunciation 
of such intrigues, made it particularly inconvenient for the president 
^Governor David Byrdie Mitchell to William Ettstis, April 20, 
1812, in Letter Book A, pp. 66-68. 
and the secretary of state to be caught supporting an intrigue of similar 
nature in the Spanish territory.2® The similarity between the Henry 
Letters and Mathews' intrigue in East Florida was too close to be over¬ 
looked. Furthermore, the Federalist press was rigorously denouncing the 
affair and asking for an explanation. Caught in this embarrassing 
situation, there was nothing else for the Madison administration to do 
except dismiss Mathews. 
On April U, the Secretary of State, James Monroe, informed the 
aged General George Mathews that his conduct in regard to East Florida 
had been too vigorous. "I am sorry to have to state," wrote Monroe, "that 
the measures which you appear to have adopted for obtaining possession 
of Amelia Island, and other parts of East Florida, are not authorized by 
the law of the United States, or the instructions founded on it under 
which you have acted." Monroe then explained that force was to have 
been used only in case of an attempt to occupy the province by a third 
power; that, even if occupied by the United States, the province was to 
have been held subject to negotiations when Spain should once more have 
a settled government. The Secretary told Mathews as a result of his 
actions it was necessary to discontinue "the service in which you have 
been employed." Monroe then informed Mathews that his powers were there- 
29 
with transferred to the Governor of Georgia. 
Julius William Pratt, Expansionists of 1812 (Gloucester, Mass¬ 
achusetts: Peter Smith, 1957), p. 109. (Hereinafter cited as Pratt, 
Expansionists.) For an explanation of the Henry Letters, see above 
p. 30. 
^James Monroe to George Mathews, /pril b, 1812, Monroe Papers, 
Pead Collection, University of Georgia Library, Athens. (Hereinafter 
cited as Monroe Papers.) 
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When word of the rebuke reached William Harris Crawford, the 
Senator wrote a friend, H,poor old Mathevrs, I am afraid he will die of 
mortification and resentment.Crawford was right. En route to 
Washington where he planned to expose the administration, Mathevs fell 
ill of a fever at Augusta and died there on August 3C, 1812, his seventy- 
third birthday. As a tribute to the old Revolutionary soldier, Covemor 
Mitchell ordered officers of the militia to wear an arm band of mourning 
for thirty days. 
Six days after the dismissal of Mathews, Monroe addressed a formal 
request to Governor Mitchell to assume responsibility for affairs in 
East Florida, and to open negotiation with the Spanish governor for 
"a restoration of that state of things in the province, which existed 
before the late transactions. It is presumed," Monroe said, "that the 
arrangement will be easily and amicably made between you." This part 
of Mitchell's assignment would not be too difficult, but Monroe added 
a condition which was almost certain to prove an obstacle to any 
arrangement with the Spanish governor. Inasmuch as the rebels in Fast 
Florida had presumably been led to put much reliance in the countenance 
and support of the United States, Monroe said, it would be improper for 
the United States government to abandon them to the resentment of the 
Spanish authorities. Monroe directed Mitchell to obtain from the 
Spanish governor "the most explicit and satisfying assurance" that the 
Patriots would not be harmed.-^ In the light of these instructions, 
■^Green, "Public Life of Crawford," p. U3. 
Athens Georgia Express, October 2, 1812. 
^James Monroe to David Byrdie Mitchell, April 10, 1812, 
Monroe Papers. 
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Monroe provided the new agent with an excuse for holding troops in 
Florida. No doubt the government realized that the Spanish authorities 
would never acquiesce to these demands. 
Upon receipt of his appointment from the Secretary of State, 
Mitchell requested more explicit instructions. In reply Monroe gave 
him additional instructions which made it perfectly clear that the 
troops of the United States were not, for the present, to be withdrawn 
from East Florida. 
Mitchell was informed by Monroe that "by the law, of which a 
copy was forwarded to you, it is made the duty of the President to 
prevent the occupation of East Florida by any foreign power." Mitchell, 
therefore, was to continue the occupation of East Florida should he see 
any danger of the landing of British troops in Florida. Monroe reiterated 
the condition that the occupation was to be continued unless assurances 
of safety for the Patriots could be secured. And if no British troops 
appeared, and the Spanish showed signs of yielding to these impossible 
conditions, the new agent was to report fully to his government, 
"holding in the meantime the ground occupied."33 
The failure of the rebellion, and the tentative decision of the 
government to restore East Florida to the Spanish authorities, created 
additional problems for Georgia. With Spain an ally of Great Britain, 
and with the approach of the inevitable conflict between the United 
States and SigLand, would not the British use Florida from which to 
launch an attack on the United States? Militarily, this seemed highly 
33james Monroe to David Byrdie Mitchell, May 27, 1812, 
Monroe Papers. 
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probable to Georgians. Weak and defenseless Georgia with an unpro¬ 
tected shoreline over one hundred miles long, extending from Savannah 
to Saint Marys, could offer but feeble resistance to the more formidable 
British. Even more terrifying to Georgians than a British attack was 
the fear that the British would stir up the savage red neighbors who 
occupied lands borderong on three sides of the state. The probability 
of an attack by the British along the sea coast, the Seminoles from 
Florida, the Creeks from the west, and the Cherokees from the north, 
was the source of immense anxiety to the citizens of Georgia. 
Governor Mitchell entered into the federal government's plan 
with enthusiasm. Most of the problems of the state would be solved if 
the United States could take over the Spanish province. 
He received his assignment upon his return to Milledgeville from 
an inspection tour of two of the four militia divisions within the state. 
He immediately ordered one thousand men from the division he had just 
inspected to be prepared to march on a moment's notice, and departed for 
Saint Marys on April 2lt, 1812.^ For four months he was destined to be 
the principal actor in a serio-comedy type of international intrigue 
which called for quick thinking and acting. 
During the first week of May, 1012, Mitchell's actions reassured 
the Patriots in Fast Florida. He rescinded an order for the abolition 
of the customs house at Fernandina and informed the American commander to 
hold his position before Saint Augustine. He kept the gunboats, which 
had been ordered withdrawn, on the Saint Johns River. These incidents 
brought a temporary increase in the number of Patriots. Their morale 
3h Augusta Chronicle, May 1, 1812. 
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revived, they talked hopefully of storming the fort, Castillo de San 
Marcos, at Saint Augustine.^ 
Mitchell then began negotiations with Governor Juan Jose de 
Estrada. On May U, he informed the Spanish governor of the disavowal 
of Mathews and the American government's desire for peace.' Mitchell's 
letter brought an indignant reply from Estrada. The Spanish governor 
had seen in the newspapers of the United States the announcement of the 
government's disapproval of the conduct of its agent, and had supposed 
"that the United States troops would have been withdrawn ere now: until 
that takes place, I can hold no treaty," and, he added, he could not be 
37 held responsible for any unpleasant occurrences in the meantime. After 
a fruitless exchange of notes, Mitchell broke off communications with 
the Spanish governor. 
In June, Sebastian Kendelan replaced Estrada as governor at 
Saint Augustine and on June 11, he sent Mitchell an ultimatum, demanding 
that the troops be withdrawn within eleven days and threatening 
"disagreeable measures" if such were not done. Mitchell replied that 
the troops would not be withdrawn, "until such explanation is given 
^Rembert Wallace Patrick, Florida Fiasco (Athens: University 
of Georgia Press, 195it), p« 13U. (Hereinafter cited as Patrick, 
Fiasco.) 
^David Byrdie Mitchell to Juan Jose de Estrada, May U, 1812, 
in East Florida Papers, 1812-1821, Georgia Department of Archives and 
History, Atlanta. 
^Juan Jose de Estrada to David Byrdie Mitchell, May 9, 1812, 
quoted in Niles' Weekly Register, III (January 16, 1813), 312. 
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for the attack3® made upon them as will evidence the sincerity of the 
desire you express of seeing the harmony of the two countries preserved, 
and be consistent with the honor of the United States to receive." He 
39 
warned the Spanish governor that force would be met with force. 
Meanwhile, the Georgia press attempted to enlist support for the 
acquisition of the FLoridas. From an economic standpoint, declared 
the editor of the Milledgeville Georgia Journal, "it ^est Florida/ 
must be highly important in a commercial point of view, and if 
connected with the country north of it, capable of prescribing maritime 
regulations to the Gulf of Mexico."^ From a political point of view, 
said the editor, "West Florida may be considered as an object of the 
greatest importance to a large division of the United States; because 
that power which holds the avenue to commerce, may give a tone to the 
measures of another, should it be unfriendly to liberty and public 
happiness." East Florida, the editor further stated, may be considered 
as "one of the main keys to the trade of the Gulf of Mexico."^" The 
3®The Patriots or the American troops, it is not quite clear which, 
in their effort to cut off supplies from Saint Augustine, had seized 
and partially fortified a blockhouse upon the shore of Moosa Creek, 
commanding one of the water approaches to Saint Augustine. The Spaniards, 
on May 15 or 16, advanced against this position with an armed schooner 
and four armed launches. Under cover of the schooner's guns the launches 
landed a small force of troops who succeeded in burning the house. 
Mitchell used this as an excuse to break off communications with the 
Spanish governor. Pratt, Expansionists, pp. 191-192. 
^Athens Georgia Express, July 3, 1812; Pratt, Expansionists, 
p. 192. 
^Milledgeville Georgia Journal, April 1, 1812. 
^Ibid. 
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editor of the .Augusta Chronicle looked with dismay on the possibility 
of allowing Spain to retain East Florida. In his opinion, war with 
^gland justified the seisure of the Floridas as a defensive measure, 
for they would be more important to FhgLand than all the other Spanish 
colonies in the New World. Furthermore, should Fast Florida be 
restored to Spanish authorities, "the consequences will be injurious 
to the United States, and fatal to the lower part of the State of 
Georgia," asserted the editor.^ 
The editor of the Georgia Journal was equally concerned over 
the threat to Georgia if the Floridas were allowed to remain under 
Spanish control. In an editorial on May 20, which strongly advocated 
the seizure of East Florida, the question was asked readers: "Would 
not East Florida be the resort, and St. Augustine the safe refuge, of 
your runaway negroes & of freebooters? Do not the lower Creeks at this 
time receive their supplies, partly from Pensacola? and would not the 
British, if in force there, command their service in harassing the 
exposed settlements in Georgia . . . ?" When the safety of a territory 
imperiously demands the adoption of a strong measure, the editor stated, 
"it is no time to quibble about its justice. The necessity of the case 
will completely justify the act, and ^Sreat Britain/ furnish us prece¬ 
dents without number.it is evident that in the minds of the people 
of Georgia their peace and prosperity depended upon the subjugation of 
^Augusta Chronicle, May 8, 1812. 
^^Milledgeville Georgia Journal, May 20, 1812. 
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the Floridas. War with Qreat Britain would provide the justification 
for such an act. 
As war drew closer in the spring of 1812, Georgians became 
more demanding and vociferous about the annexation of the Floridas. 
Their sentiments were expressed in a number of meetings held throughout 
the state. At a meeting in Savannah on June 3> resolutions were adopted 
which declared that: 
it would be wise and prudent in the government of the United States, 
from the present disorganised state of East Florida, to hold 
possession of that province; and, by the aid of a competent force, 
to obtain its early surrender, not only as a measure of precaution 
against foreign occupancy, and for this still more important 
consideration, that the safety of our southern frontier greatly 
depends on an absolute domination by the United States over that 
province. . . 
Five days prior to the declaration of war, on June 13, the citizens of 
Milledgeville held a meeting in which they reiterated charges that 
Qreat Britain had placed weapons in the hands of the Indians and caused 
them to make war upon Georgia's frontier. In view of these circum¬ 
stances, they asserted, the immediate occupancy of East Florida by the 
United States was "essential to the interest of the country and the 
safety of our frontier."^ 
The petitions of the Georgia citizens did not fall on deaf ears. 
On the day following the declaration of war, June 19, George Michael 
Troup, a representative from Georgia, introduced a resolution in the 
House instructing the committee formerly appointed to consider relations 
with the Spanish American colonies, to inquire into the expediency of 
^Savannah Republican and Evening Ledger, June U, 1812. (Here¬ 
inafter cited as Savannah Republican.) 
hS 
Milledgeville Georgia Journal, June 17, 1812. 
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authorizing the president to occupy Fast and West Florida, and to 
report to the House on that matter.^ A bill was introduced which 
authorized the president "to occupy and hold, the whole or any part of 
East Florida, including Amelia Island, and also those parts of West 
Florida which are not now in possession and under the jurisdiction of 
the United States." The bill provided an appropriation of $100,000 and 
authorized the president to use the military and naval forces to effect 
the occupation and to set up a temporary government in the territory 
occupied. This proposal was justified on the ground that Spain, the 
owner of Florida, was an ally of Great Britain and would allow the 
latter to make use of Florida as a base of operations against the United 
States. The House passed the bill on June 25 and sent it to the Senate.^ 
In the Senate, Georgia's senior Senator, William Harris Crawford, 
offered an amendment to the House bill which connected the annexation 
of Canada with that of Florida. His amendment authorized the president 
to establish a temporary government if "in the prosecution of the present 
war against" Great Britain the United States "should obtain possession 
of the British possessions in North America, or either of them." It 
further provided "that the principles" upon which the temporary govern¬ 
ment should be established, should not obstruct the restoration of 
U8 
peace between the two nations. Florida and Canada were both to be 
prizes of successful wars, to be occupied by the nation's armed forces 
Annals of Congress, 12 Cong., 1 sess., II, 1683. 
^
7Ibid., I, 32h; ibid., l68U-l68$. 
k8Ibid., I, 325-326j ibid., II, 1685-1686. 
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and provided with temporary governments. Crawford's proposal was 
apparently made as a sop to the East in order to obviate their objec¬ 
tions to the occupation of Florida. The amendment passed to the third 
and final reading. When passage of the bill seemed certain, three of the 
foes of the administration, William Branch Giles, Michael Leib and John 
Pope, voted with the Federalists. This party faction caused the bill to 
ho 
be defeated by a vote of fourteen to sixteen. 
Rejection of the bill by the Senate was met with astonishment and 
bitter disappointment in Georgia. "This extraordinary circumstance 
considering the times, and our situation in that country," lamented the 
editor of the Augusta Chronicle, "may truly be considered a national 
misfortune which cannot . . . easily be repaired."^0 The editor of the 
Milledgeville Georgia Journal learned with "regret" that the bill had 
been rejected by the Senate. Gloomily the editor predicted Georgia's 
futurej 
So long as Augustine, Pensacola and Mobile are occupied by the 
enemy or their allies, so long is the tranquility of our 
Southern frontier jeopardised, the property and lives of our 
citizens placed almost at the mercy of the foe, and our country 
exposed to invasion and depredation at the most vulnerable point.51 
One week later on August 5, the editor of the Journal enlisted the 
support of Georgians when he declared that "it was a rational and very 
general belief ... that the President would have been authorized by 
Congress to take possession of all Fast Florida--and to aid in the 
accomplishment of this object, so necessary to the safety of our 
k^Green, "Public Life of Crawford," p. 1*9. 
^Augusta Chronicle, July 21;, 1812. 
^■Milledgeville Georgia Journal, July 29, 1812. 
65 
Southern frontier." The editor of the Athens Georgia Express, echoing 
the sentiments of other Republican newspapers, stated that the senators 
"have left the state of Georgia, in particular, in a very critical 
situation." This unrestrained editorial pointed out that the State of 
Georgia could not constitutionally lend aid to the Patriots, but added 
that Georgians as individuals could still assist their fellow southerners 
and at the same time share in the fruits of their patriotism. "No 
authority prevents them from going to East Florida," suggested the paper, 
and "when there they can Join the Patriots—they can assist in conquering 
the country—and Five Hundred Acres of Excellent LAND, and the Emanci¬ 
pation from BONDAGE of many of their fellow Georgians/ will be their 
Reward." Further, the editor asserted, "it is essential to the REAL 
Independence of America, that both East and Vest Florida become an 
integral part of the United States. "->3 
Meanwhile, the situation in East Florida had reached a stalemate. 
The Patriots remained camped before Saint Augustine, and with them 
remained Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Smith and his detachment of United 
States riflemen. The force was weak, even with both contingents. To 
bolster the sagging military force, Governor Mitchell in early June 
enlisted the support of a hundred or more men from Savannah, the Savannah 
Volunteer Guards and the Republican Blues. ^ He sent his Adjutant 
General, Colonel Daniel Newnan, into the Piedmont area with orders 
^Milledgeville Georgia Journal, August 5, 1812. 
^Athens Georgia Express, August 28, 1812. 
^Savannah Republican, June 13, 1812. 
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for assembling volunteers at Dublin. The new recruits were to serve 
for periods of sixty days, but it was hoped that by a succession of such 
calls the requisite number of men might be kept in service as long as 
their presence should be required. By the end of June, more than five 
hundred troops were reported enroute for Colonel Smith's camp and a 
planned attack on Saint Augustine. 
In early July, Monroe comunicated to Mitchell a copy of the act 
of Congress declaring war against Great Britain with instructions as 
to how he was to proceed should the British have already landed in East 
Florida. He was instructed to inform the Spanish governor that the 
United States, in declaring war against Great Britain, did not wish to 
extend it to Spain. Mitchell, however, was to ijnpress upon the Spanish 
official, with thorough conviction, that the landing of British troops 
in East Florida would be considered as proof of Spain's hostile disposi¬ 
tion toward the United States. Further, he was instructed to make the 
best possible terms for the Patriots. If British troops had not landed 
in East Florida, Mitchell was to withdraw his troops from the territory. 
Knowing that Mitchell would be extremely disappointed and no 
doubt bitter as a result of the government's decision to withdraw 
United States troops from the province, Monroe added that the "object 
is not to be considered abandoned. ..." It was likely, he said, that 
during the next session Congress might reverse its decision; but in the 
meantime it would not be proper for the troops to remain in Florida in 
-^Milledgeville Georgia Journal, July 1, 1812. 
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the absence of means and authority to take possession of the entire 
province. 
Mitchell was keenly chagrined over the government's decision 
to abandon Florida. In his opinion, the revolt of the Patriots and 
the partial occupation of the Spanish province made annexation even 
more imperative. Furthermore, war with England had presented Georgians 
with the opportunity to rid themselves of a constant threat to their 
safety and to secure valuable land and water outlets to the Gulf of 
Mexico. Toward that end Mitchell had worked assiduously to place the 
Georgia militia in service in East Florida, with the result that hundreds 
of Georgians had volunteered and had enthusiastically moved south. 
Knowing of the federal government's desire for Florida, he had confi¬ 
dently expected congressional sanction of the occupation of the colony, 
and the requisite military power for its conquest. Once committed to 
war, he was convinced that the United States would send troops into 
East Florida before Great Britain could secure the province for her 
ally.57 
To him, the Senate's denial of the Florida project was "legis¬ 
lative treason." He wrote Monroe that he had learned with "surprise and 
mortification" of the fate of the Florida measure in the Senate. He 
protested against the withdrawal of the troops as a measure fraught with 
great danger to the southern states, and added that, instead of ordering 
Smith to withdraw, he had sent him such re-enforcements as he thought 
5
^James Monroe to Governor David Byrdie Mitchell, July 6, 1812, 
Monroe Papers. 
-^Georgia Senate Journal (1812), p. 9. 
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"necessary to enable him to maintain his ground, and to prepare him 
either to meet any re-enforcements which might be received by the 
Spaniards, or to take possession of /Saint Augustine/ if ordered!'^® 
Mitchell continued to pursue a policy for which he had no authority 
and for which he might lose face, should the Madison administration 
rebuke him as it had Ma thews, ibe governor knowingly took that chance, 
believing it a duty owed to the United States and to Georgia. 
Believing his services were needed more at the state capitol 
than at Saint Marys, Mitchell informed Monroe of his intentions to keep 
the armed force in East Florida, and departed for Milledgeville. Before 
he reached the city, he became critically ill and for several weeks he 
accomplished little. 
Other state leaders took up the governor's task. At a mass 
meeting of citizens of Greene County on August 13, 1812, resolutions 
were adopted and sent to the president and Congress advocating the 
immediate acquisition of Florida. The petitioners insisted that the 
United States was justified in forcibly taking the Floridas and 
expressed disappointment that the Senate had rejected the bill authoriz¬ 
ing the president to take possession of the colony. Demanding the 
immediate occupation of Florida, the petitioners asserted that the 
Floridas in the hands of Great Britain wmld allow the British 
to annoy our Southern coasting trade, and to pursue with success 
the odious abominable practice of smuggling; and in possession of 
the Floridas will not our enemy have it greatly in her power to 
stir up against us the merciless and unrelenting Savages immediately 
bordering upon us: and from a history of the revolutionary war, 
^Quoted in Pratt, Expansionists, pp. 19U-195. 
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have we not much to fear from her seductive overtures to our 
black population, exciting them to abandon their owners and 
perhaps rise up in rebellion against them.5" 
The citizens of Camden County, a county adjacent to East Florida, 
voiced their grievances against Spanish Florida at a meeting in early 
October. They charged the Spanish with offering bribes and rewards 
to the blades and Indians in Florida to commit murder upon the Patriots 
there. Forays, including murder and pillage, had recently been extended 
to Camden County exposing the militia of Camden to "extraordinary 
vicissitudes, in the performance of military duty which more justly ought 
to be expected from troops of the United States. . . 
"Jackson" writing in the Savannah Republican expressed confidence 
in the wisdom of the Madison administration, but wanted to know what 
principle of justice or policy restrained it from calling upon the 
Governor of Georgia to direct the "vengeance of our militia against 
the garrison of St. Augustine? The blood of our slaughtered citizens 
call aloud for it, /Ehe reduction of Saint Augustinfi/ the duty of the 
6l government owes itself, and the people demand it," asserted the writer.' 
"Jackson" further called on the federal government to adopt swift and 
decisive measures that would result in a speedy capture of the Spanish 
capitol. 
59citizens of Greene County to President James Madison, August 13, 
1812, in Georgia-Fast Florida-West Florida and Yazoo Land Sales, 176h- 
18^0, pp. 185-188, Georgia Department of Archives and History, Atlanta. 
^Savannah Republican, October 10, 1812. 
6lIbid., October 27, 1812. 
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The editor of the MilledgevlUe Georgia Journal announced that 
it was "high time the eyes of the people were opened to Georgians/ 
situation. Under existing circumstances, the reduction of St. Augustine, 
as we have repeatedly stated, is essential to our safety. 
The decision of the Madison administration to withdraw troops 
from the Spanish colony was accompanied by dim hopes that subjugation 
of the Floridas would be accomplished, and the people of Georgia talked 
as if their cause had been abandoned. They insisted that they had 
patriotically supported the Republican administration and upheld its 
policies, even though the policies were often detrimental to them. In 
return for this support, Georgians expected Florida to be taken, by 
force if necessary. The failure of the United States to send sufficient 
forces to accomplish the reduction of Saint Augustine and its decision 
to withdraw the small contingency of troops already there, was a matter 
of great concern. 
In the meantime, the Spanish governor, Kindelan, instigated a 
rebellion by the Negroes and Indians against Americans in Fast Florida. 
Kindelan told them that the capture of Saint Augustine by the Americans 
would end the freedom of the Negro, and abrogate use of hunting lands 
of the Indians. To gain support in helping to drive Americans out of 
Florida, Kindelan offered the Negroes and Indians eight dollars and a 
bottle of rum for each white scalp.^ n0 better inducement could have 
been offered the rum-loving miscreants. Attacks upon the Patriots 
Milledgeville Georgia Journal, October 7, 1812. 
^Savannah Republican, October 20, 1812. 
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accomplished all that Kindelan had anticipated. The Patriots threw 
their muskets over their shoulders and fled in haste from the camp, 
leaving Colonel Smith and his American soldiers, almost half of whom 
were ill, to face the Indians and Spaniards. The Indians continued their 
onslaught against the whites wreaking havoc along both sides of the 
Saint Johns River as their mounted raiders ventured as far north as the 
Saint Marys.^1 
Colonel Smith proposed to end the peril by carrying the war into 
the Indian country. At this juncture, the Adjutant General of Georgia, 
Colonel Daniel Newnan, with 25>0 volunteers from Georgia, entered in the 
service of the United States for 60 days.^ Smith ordered Newnan to 
proceed immediately against the hostile Indians and to destroy their 
towns, provisions and settlements. Difficulty in procuring horses 
and supplies, and the ravages of malaria in Newnan's forces, however, 
delayed the time of departure for several weeks. During the delay, 
the sixty days enlistment time of Newnan's volunteers was coming to an 
end, and the men, anxious to leave the sweltering sun and the heavy 
rains of Florida, became increasingly discontented. Although Newnan 
pleaded for an extension of the enlistment time, many refused to follow 
their colonel's pleas, demanding instead transports for home. 
In the face of adverse circumstances, by September 2U, Newnan 
managed to increase his volunteer force from 75 to 117. Vowing to end 
the Indian menace, Newnan set off to destroy the Alachua towns. The 
^Augusta Mirror of the Times, August 31, 1812. 
^^Milledgeville Georgia Journal, August 12, 1812. 
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attempt was courageous but ill-conceived, the force too small, the 
distance too great and the provisions insufficient. On the fourth day 
out, when nearing the Alachua settlements, the little party encountered 
a band of Indians and Negroes, who fled at the militia's charge but took 
refuge in a swamp whence they cculd not be dislodged. Unable to advance 
against the enemy and unwilling to retreat, Newnan entrenched himself 
near the scene of the encounter and sent a messanger for re-enforcements. 
For a week the party lived in the stockade, subsisting on horse meat. 
Finally, threatened with desertion by one of the companies of his 
command, Newnan attempted a night retreat, carrying his wounded on 
stretchers. The same night a relief party of twenty-five horsemen with 
provisions reached the stockade by another route, and finding it 
deserted, returned to the Saint Johns. Newnan's party, sick, discouraged 
and mutinous, struggled on foot for several days through the wilderness, 
living on gophers, alligators and palmetto stocks, while being subjected 
to intermittent attacks from the Indians. At length, with the aid of a 
second relief party, they reached the Saint Johns with all their sick 
and wounded, and were transported by gunboat to Colonel Smith's camp. 
The expedition had ended in retreat. Newnan estimated that he had 
killed or wounded fifty of the enemy while his own losses had been about 
twenty-five. He had not come within sight of an Indian town or a supply 
depot.^ 
cc 
"^Daniel Newnan to Sovemor David Byrdie Mitchell, October 19, 
1812, in Niles' Weekly Register, III (December 12, 1814 235-237. 
67lbid. 
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While Newnan was on his fruitless mission, Colonel Smith's 
situation at Saint Augustine had become critical. Unable to take the 
heavily fortified town, he had fallen back twenty miles to the Saint 
Johns. When Governor Mitchell realized the impending failure of Newnan 
and learned of Colonel Smith's retreat, he ordered ten companies of 
Georgia militia to Point Petre, Georgia, located four miles above Saint 
68 Marys, and informed Floyd to re-enforce Smith without delay. He 
issued a general order authorizing General Floyd to collect and deposit 
at Traders Hill provisions f rr five hundred men and horses. Floyd was 
instructed to publicize the forthcoming expedition as one against Saint 
Augustine, but actually he was to destroy the Sendnole towns first and 
69 
then turn on the fortress. 
In the midst of preparations for a second attempt at subduing the 
Seminoles in East Florida, the Secretary of State relieved Mitchell as 
an agent of the federal go-"emment. On October 13, the Secretary 
informed him that his powers were transferred to Major General Thomas 
Pinckney, adding that the conduct of his mission had "the entire approba- 
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tion and the thanks of the President.11 The reason for this change 
probably was due to the fact that Mitchell, like Mathews, was over¬ 
stepping authority in the use of force against Spanish Florida. Negotia¬ 
tions were being conducted with De Onis, the Spanish minister, and Monroe 
hoped to obtain possession of the province by peaceable means. 
Governor David Byrdie Mitchell to John Floyd, September 26, 
1812, in Letter Book A, pp. 76-77. 
69Ibid., October 13, 1812, op. 7Q-79. 
James Monroe to Governor David Byrdie Mitchell, October 13, 1812, 
Monroe Papers. 
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The insistence that the Spanish be driven from Florida and that 
the hostile Indians be subdued was further revealed when the Georgia 
General Assembly convened on November 2, 1812. In his message to the 
lawmakers, Governor Mitchell reviewed the course of events in East 
Florida since the outbreak of the revolution. He had hoped, he said, 
from the part played by General Mathews, that the government had resolved 
upon the occupation of the entire province. Upon the declaration of war 
against Great Britain, he said he had again looked forward to such 
action, "knowing as I did, and still do, that the interest of Georgia 
would be effectually promoted by that event, and the views and wishes 
of the General Government at the same time accomplished." The governor 
further statedt 
The Senate of the United States, however, in their wisdom had 
different views of the subject, and the matter was permitted to 
remain as before the war. It is nevertheless my sincere and candid 
opinion, that the peace and safety of this state will be hazarded 
if the occupancy of East Florida by our government is relinquished 
or much longer delayed.71 
The governor then referred to the employment of Negro troops and Indian 
allies by the Spanish: 
The present force in Augustine is of a description which we cannot 
tolerate, and the mode of warfare which the governor of that place 
has commenced, is so savage and barbarous, that it is impossible 
for an American to hear it without feeling the utmost indignation 
and resentment against the powers who commands or even permits it, 
I recommend this subject in an especial manner to your most serious 
consideration, as involving, not only your immediate interest, but 
your future peace and happiness.72 
"^•kleorgia Senate Journal (1812), p. 9 
72Ibid. 
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The governor's message was referred to a joint committee and 
the committee made its report on November 9. The committee unanimously 
favored immediate and decisive measures by either federal or state 
government for the occupation of East Florida. Since the Senate of the 
United States had for some inexplicable reason rejected the House bill 
for occupying the Floridas, the members of the joint committee insisted 
that the State of Georgia must act. Public safety combined with urgent 
necessity over-shadowed all other considerations and justified by every 
legitimate and universally recognized principle of the law of nations the 
seizure of East Florida these legislators stated. In the opinion of the 
members of the comnittee, the use of Indians and Negroes in warfare 
made danger imminent and gave the people of Georgia the right to occupy 
and hold East Florida until the time when the national government 
assumed its responsibility for the security of Georgia.After hearing 
the committee's report, a bill was promptly introduced in the senate 
which authorized the governor to occupy East Florida and vested in him 
full authority to organize sufficient militia for the reduction of 
Saint Augustine. 
To make war on Spanish Florida without sanction of the federal 
government was a drastic act with the result that many legislators 
voted against independent action. The legislature did adopt a memorial 
to the United States Congress calling for federal seizure of East Florida 
^Georgia Senate Journal (1812), pp. 2U-25. 
7Wd., p. 25. 
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and threatening state action unless Georgians were protected. A 
second resolution authorized Governor Mitchell to use a voluntary cavalry 
patrol on the border for defense against marauding Indians, and for 
offense against Saint Augustine in cooperation with the force of the 
United States."^ 
Since Congress had failed in June, 1812, to sanction the subjuga¬ 
tion of East Florida, armed occupation of the province was plainly an 
unwarranted assumption of power by the president. There were two 
possible ways of bringing it under the provisions of the Constitution: 
Congress might be persuaded to reconsider its recent action, or the 
United States might acquire title to East Florida by treaty. Since 
Congress was in recess until November, Monroe tried the latter. In the 
late summer of 1012 Monroe entered into correspondence with Don Luis de 
Onis, the Spanish minister to Washington.'^''' The Secretary sought to 
learn whether de Onis had power to negotiate for the cession of East 
Florida to the United States. This correspondence, however, came to 
naught, and Monroe abandoned the negotiations with de Onis in December, 
1812. 
"^Georgia Senate Journal (1812), pp. iil-li3. 
76Ibid., pp. h5-U6. 
"^Pratt, "Monroe," III, 260-261. De Onis had been appointed 
minister to the United States by Charles T7 of Spain. Uut as Charles 
had been replaced by Joseph Bonaparte, and the latter had been driven 
from his throne by a party acting in the name of Ferdinand VIII, it 
was difficult to say whom, if any one, Onis now represented. In fact, 
the United States had recognized neither the government of Joseph 
Bonaparte nor that of Ferdinand. 
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When the lawmakers convened, the Madison administration sought 
to make a fresh attempt to carry through Congress a bill authorizing 
the president to take possession of the whole of Florida. The Senate 
supported a measure calling for a committee to investigate and report 
the advisability of occupying Florida."^ On January lh. President 
Madison furnished the committee with a report drawn by Monroe, the 
Secretary of State. Monroe stated that he had no knowledge of any 
plan of the British to occupy Florida, but argued that there was every 
reason to expect such an occupation and that the United States was 
unlikely to receive warning in advance. This impending danger together 
with the .American "spoilations" claims against Spain, and the alleged 
wishes of the Patriots to place the province under the American flag, 
Monroe argued, made it expedient to take armed possession of the 
Floridas."^ 
On January 19, 1813, the committee reported a bill authorizing 
the president to occupy all of Florida and to establish a government 
there, provided that the portion of the country east of the Perdido 
River might be "the subject of future negotiation." The proposal found 
favor with southern but not with northern senators. The measure could 
be of little benefit to the northern states, and the Federalists were 
unwilling to be a party to Republican expansion. On a motion by Samuel 
Smith of Maryland, the Senate voted nineteen to sixteen, to amend the 
bill so as to limit its application to the section of Florida west of 
*78 Annals of Congress, 12 Cong., 2 sess., I, 12U-125>. 
79Pratt, "Monroe," III, 262. 
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the Perdido River, all of which the United States claimed as part of 
the Louisiana purchase, and all of which except Mobile it actually 
held. In this innocuous form, the bill passed the Senate and the 
Rouse. As a result in May, 1813, the small force of regulars and 
militia which had been on Florida soil since the opening of Mathews' 
enterprise was withdrawn. Thus, twenty-five months after the opening 
of the revolution in East Florida, the United States finally repudiated 
all connection with it. 
For the second time the people of Georgia saw their hopes come 
to naught. Painfully disappointed, nevertheless, they continued to 
express their feelings on the necessity of occupying Fast Florida. 
Governor Mitchell perhaps summed up the sentiments of the majority of 
Georgians when he wrote a friend that "until the Spaniards and Indians 
are driven from the Floridas we shall never have permanent security. . . 
Georgians lost in the initial effort to annex Florida. They 
supported a war with Great Britain, believing that as a result Florida 
would become a part of the United States. Such a step, they believed, 
was imperative to the safety and welfare of their state. Georgians had 
faced the Spanish musket and the Indian tomahawk in East Florida, but 
Spain still remained in possession of the coveted territory. For almost 
another ten years, the citizens of Georgia endured the Spanish menace to 
the south. It was not until 1819 when Spain agreed to a treaty of 
80 Annals of Congress, 12 Cong., 2 sess., I, 130. 
O, 
Governor David Byrdie Mitchell to Judge Toulman, September 20, 
1813, in Letter Book A, p. 163. 
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cession that the northern boundary of Florida was resolved and the 
territory to Georgia* s south was brought under the authority of the 
United States.®2 
Op 
"^Florida was ceded by Spain to the United States by the terms 
of the Adams-Onis treaty, signed February 22, 1819. Bailey, Diplomatic 
History, pp. 172-173. 
CHAPTSt III 
THE CREEK WAR, 1813-181U 
The decision of President James Madison to remove federal troops 
from Florida in 1813 and to recognize Spain's authority over territory 
which had been held by American forces since 1812, temnorarily thwarted 
the hopes of Georgians to rid themselves of the Spanish "menace." 
Frustrated in this effort, public attention was directed to the removal 
of the Creek Indians from the western boundaries of Georgia, a second 
objective proposed by Georgians in the war of 1812. 
The desire to remove the Creeks was not a new issue during the 
war of 1812. Georgians had for years coveted the rich lands held by 
the Creeks in the western part of the state. This ardor for western 
land was given a strong impetus by the emergence of cotton as the major 
agricultural product in Georgia following Eli Whitney's invention of the 
cotton gin in 1793» British demands for cotton far exceeded the American 
supply, with the result that in 1800 cotton sold for as high as forty- 
four cents per pound.With the prospect of a good profit, each year 
Georgia farmers planted more and more cotton, purchased more land and 
more Negro slaves whom they discovered to be well suited for the culti¬ 
vation of cotton. Desiring additional acres to expand cotton production, 
Georgians were soon clamoring for the rich lands held by the Creeks. 
•'■Lewis Cecil Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern United 
States to i860, 2 Volumes (New YorFT Peter Smith,T9UL), IT, 682. 
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The Creek territory, which extended from the Florida border 
northward to an uncertain latitude approximately at the future site of 
Atlanta, constituted a vast acreage and embraced some of the finest 
potential cotton lands in the state. Creek occupancy of these choice 
lands was a constant source of complaint among land-seeking citizens. 
The people of Georgia believed that they were justified in seeking 
to remove the Creeks from the state's western border. One of the con¬ 
tingencies by which Georgia had agreed to cede her western lands to the 
United States government in 1802 was based upon the promise that the 
government would remove the Indians from these lands as soon as it could 
be done peaceably and on reasonable terms. Yet, according to Georgians, 
the central government had not carried out its pledge. The Indians 
still remained an obstacle to Georgia's westward expansion. The govern¬ 
ment, in order to placate Georgia, negotiated treaty after treaty whereby 
the Indians agreed to yield certain portions of their territory to 
Georgians. Between 1802 and 1805 three Creek cessions moved the boundary 
of Georgia from the Oconee westward to the line of the Ocmulgee River 
and westward from the coast to include the Tallassee strip, originally 
organized as Wayne County. Still this was not enough for the land 
seekers. Discontented, the citizens of Georgia contended that all lands 
in the state be free of Indian claims thus giving the people of the state 
a chance to utilize the new soil held by the Creeks. 
2 
Charles Joseph Kappler, editor, Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties, 
h Volumes (Washington: Government Printing Office, 190li), II, 8-16, 25-39, 
U6-50, 58-59, 73-7U, 82-86. (Hereinafter cited as Kappler, Indian 
Affairs.) Treaties were made in 1783, 1785, 1786, 1790, 1791a, 1796, 
1802, 1801a and 1805. 
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Following the path to virgin soil, Georgia's expansion was 
always westward, west by north during the first half of the eighteenth 
century, then west by south. The state's rapid westward expansion is 
reflected in the number of new counties created between 1000 and 1820. 
From 1800 to 1810, fifteen new counties were created, and from 1810 to 
1820, seven were added.^ These counties were located chiefly in the 
western portion of the state and illustrate the rapidity with which the 
best western lands were settled. Georgia's westward progress in the 
early nineteenth century is further illustrated by the frequent relocatior 
of the state's capitol. The capitol, which was moved to Augusta from 
Savannah at the end of the Revolution, was again relocated at Louisville 
in 1795» By I80U, the westward moving people considered Louisville too 
far east and legislated into existence the town of Mill edge ville, making 
it the new capitol in 1807. 
Westward expansion also created in Georgians a desire to control 
navigation on the Alabama River which ran through the Creek nation. 
Control of the Alabama would give the citizens of Georgia access to the 
port of New Orleans, thus opening new markets and thereby stimulating 
commerce. Furthermore, because of expensive overland transportation, 
a water highway to New Orleans would allow Georgians to ship farm 
products to the port city at a substantial savings. For the same 
reason, citizens of Georgia would pay less for merchandise imported into 
•^Second Census of the United States (Washington« Duane Printer, 
1801), pp. 2,^-2,0; Aggregate~Smount of Persons Within the United States 
in the Year 1810, Thira Census BooF~(>?hshlngton, 1811), pp. 80-82; 
Census for 1820, Fourth Census (Washingtont Gales and Seaton, 1821), 
pp. 28-29. 
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the state by way of the new water route. One contemporary source 
estimated that Georgians living in the western part of the state, by 
utilizing the Alabama, could secure goods cheaper from New Orleans than 
could be procured overland from Savannah, a distance of only lUO miles 
from Milledgeville.k However tantalizing these commercial advantages 
may have appeared to citizens of Georgia, they could not hope to achieve 
them until the Creeks were removed farther west. 
The prospects of more and richer lands, cheaper transportation 
costs and new markets were in themselves sufficient reasons to engender 
a strong desire to expel the Creeks from Georgia's border. These argu¬ 
ments, when coupled with the fact that the Indians were also undesirable 
neighbors who frequently resorted to savage atrocities against settlers 
living along the frontier, made removal of the Indians a prime issue. 
According to federal regulations, Georgia could not forcibly remove the 
Indians without first receiving sanction of the central government. 
This the United States refused to give, preferring instead the gradual 
method of removing the Indians by negotiating treaties. 
The insatiable appetite for more and better farming land 
engendered sharp conflicts between Georgians and their red neighbors. 
The Indians had long resisted the encroachment of the white man and for 
good reason. Not only did the white man force the Indians to give up 
their lands but he also allowed his hogs, cattle and horses to wonder 
across the border, mixing with Indian livestock. Furthermore, Georgia 
settlers fished in streams running through Indian territory and destroyed 
^iilledgeville Georgia Journal, September 29, 1813. 
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the game, hunting deer by firelight, and frightening Indian hunters from 
their hunting grounds. The Indians, in retaliation, often conducted 
plundering forays along the frontier of Georgia, murdering, destroying 
property and stealing livestock.^ 
Grievances against the Indians induced Governor David Byrdie 
Mitchell in 1810, under the provision of a legislative resolution of 
1807, to appoint a commission headed by General David Stewart to go into 
the Creek nation to demand either the return of or compensation for 
property allegedly stolen from the people of Georgia. The governor 
wrote Benjamin Hawkins, United States Indian Agent, on October 8, 1810, 
explaining the state's intentions, pointing out that Georgians were 
growing impatient with repeated delays in recouping losses sustained at 
the hands of the Creeks. "The state of Georgia has at various times 
presented the claims of her citizens, but without success," complained 
Mitchell, "and she has born with patience those disappointments under 
the fullest confidence that the Union through their Agent would 
ultimately prevail in causing the Indians to do that Justice to 
6 
Georgians so long sought for, and so long delayed." 
With the governor's letter in hand, and an itemized list containing 
a description of property stolen by the Indians, General Stewart 
^Alexander McGillivray to Estevan Miro, October U, 1787, 
September 20, 1788, in John Vralton Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks 
(Norman1 University of Oklahoma Press, 1938), pp. 150-1657 199-201. 
^Governor David Byrdie Mitchell to Benjamin Hawkins, October 8, 
1810, in Letters of Benjamin Hawkins, 1797-1815, p. 130, Department of 
Archives and History, Atlanta. (Hereinafter cited as Hawkins Letters.) 
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presented the state's demands to the Indian agent. Although Stewart 
returned to Georgia with neither property nor compensation, he did 
return with assurance from Hawkins that Georgia's claims would be 
forwarded to Washington for consideration. 
While Georgians had cause to be hostile toward the Indians, the 
Indians were equally justified in hostilities shown toward the people 
of Georgia. Always forced to yield before an ever advancing agricultural 
frontier, the Indians saw their existence threatened. It was natural 
that they should seek to contain the advancement of the white man by 
allying themselves with Great Britain in the war of 1812. The British, 
quickly sizing up the Indians' discontent, saw an opportunity to gain 
additional support in the war against the United States. 
The English in 1012 offered food and weapons as inducements to 
Tecuraseh, the Shawnee chief and leader of the Indians in the Northwest, 
O 
to visit the Creeks, Choctaws, Cherokees, Seninoles and Chickasaws to 
seek their aid and cooperation against the Americans. The Indian chief, 
an eloquent orator, visited the southern tribes and made stirring 
speeches, exhorting the Indians to attack the frontier settlements. 
^David Stewart to Governor David Byrdie Mitchell, October 13, 
1810, Hawkins Letters, p. 137. 
®The Creeks, numbering about seventeen thousand, lived in a 
loose confederation of villages in eastern Alabama territory and western 
Georgia. There were two main divisions of the confederation, the Upper 
Creeks and the Lower Creeks. The Upper Creeks lived principally along 
the Tallapoosa, Coosa and Alabama Rivers and their tributaries. The 
Lower Creeks lived in the lower Chattahoochee-Flint River area of 
Georgia. Hugh M. Thomason, "Governor Peter Early and the Creek Indian 
Frontier, 1813-1815," Georgia Historical Quarterly, XLV (1961), 223-22U. 
(Hereinafter cited as Thomason, "Farly.") 
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Tecumseh*s visit created unrest, especially among the Upper 
Creeks, culminating in numerous cases of lawlessness which alarmed the 
settlers along the Georgia frontier bordering on the Creek country. 
By the spring of 1812, a number of murders were committed by the dissi¬ 
dents. Thomas Meredith, a Georgia planter, was killed in March by 
drunken Autosses; Williara Lott, a former Georgia legislator, was robbed 
and killed by a band of Tallassies; two travelers passing through the 
Creek nation were murderedj and a family on Duck River in Tennessee was 
massacred in June by the Hallaubees on a false report that the whites 
had killed an Indian woman. Colonel Hawkins, fearful that Georgia or 
the federal government would send troops into the nation unless these 
murderers were brought to justice by their own kind, persuaded the 
Creek Council, composed of representatives from Upper and Lower Creeks, 
9 
to bring the murderers to justice. Late in August, 1812, six Upper 
Creeks had been executed for murder and seven whipped for theft. A 
council of Lower Creeks further cooperated with the Indian agent by 
announcing their determination to take no part in the war between Great 
Britain and the United States.^-® 
Perhaps the chief factor which prevented the Lower Creeks from 
"taking up the hatchet" in 1012 was the influence of Colonel Benjamin 
Hawkins. Hawkins, who had been appointed Creek Indian agent in 1796 by 
President George Washington, diligently carried out the policy of the 
^Benjamin Hawkins to Chiefs of Creek Nation, June 17, 1012, 
Hawkins Letters, pp. 155-1575 see also Milledgeville Georgia Journal, 
July 1, 1012. 
^Chiefs of Lower Creeks to Benjamin Hawkins, June 17, 1012, 
Hawkins Letters, p. 158. 
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government to civilize the Creeks. Having established his headquarters 
at Fort Hawkins, on the Ocmulgee in the midst of the Lower Creeks, the 
Indian agent virtually became "one of the Indians" with the result that 
the chiefs of the Lower Creeks usually followed his advice. Under the 
agent's firm persuasion, the Lower Creeks gradually became semi-civilized, 
practicing animal husbandry and cultivating crops. 
The Upper Creeks were not as docile. Unlike their tribal kinsmen, 
they resisted the general policy pursued by Hawkins. Refusing to farm 
for a livelihood, the Upper Creeks preferred to follow the more primitive 
ways of their ancestors. Furthermore, they had developed a deep hatred 
for the whites who continuously forced them off their hunting lands. 
Thus, the Creek nation was divided in its sentiments. The Lower Creeks 
desired to remain at peace, while the Upper Creeks favored the destruc¬ 
tion of the white man. 
It is significant to note that the Creek nation who had for years 
resisted the encroachments of the whites, and had been aided somewhat 
by the federal government's refusal to force removal, provided a major 
reason for their dislodgment in 1813. In June, the breach, which for 
years had been widening between the Upper and Lower Creeks, erupted in 
a civil war. 
An Indian massacre in Illinois triggered the Creek war. Late in 
1812 a band of some thirty Creeks, led by Chief Little Warrior of the 
Upper Creeks, journeyed to Canada where they participated in a massacre 
^"^Henry Adams, History of the United States, 9 Volumes (New York: 
Albert and Charles Boni, 1930), VII, 216-22CL (Hereinafter cited as 
Adams, History.) 
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against American militia at Raisin River. On their vay home in 
February, 1813, the Creeks were informed by some guileful or mistaken 
Chickasaws that a Creek-American war had begun. Little Warrior and his 
band acted promptly by murdering seven white families settled near the 
mouth of the Ohio in Illinois. Hawkins, at the urging of the Chickasaws 
who feared that they would be held responsible for the massacre, demanded 
that the murderers be punished. The Creek Council quickly voted the 
death penalty. In April, 1813, eight of the condemned men, including 
12 Little Warrior, were killed by warriors from the Lower Creeks. Out¬ 
raged by the execution of Little Warrior and his followers, the Upper 
Creeks determined to avenge their deaths by attacking the Lower Creeks 
and any whites within striking distance. 
It is worthy of note at this time that Hawkins, who kept in close 
contact with the Indians, wrote Georgia's governor on May 31, that there 
was "nothing hostile to be apprehended from the Creeks" as the chiefs were 
well convinced that their existence as a nation depended on the compliance 
with their treaty with the United States. Yet, three weeks later, he 
was forced to admit that a conflict between the Creeks had commenced and 
a crisis was rapidly approaching.Perhaps Hawkins had too much 
confidence in the pledge of the chiefs. Of even greater importance is 
that Hawkins, who had often been confined to bed because of illness 
during the winter of 1812-1813, was not adequately informed of the state 
^Augusta Mirror of the Times, April 17, 1813. 
"^Benjamin Hawkins to Governor David Byrdie Mitchell, May 31, 
1813, Hawkins Letters, p, 198; ibid., Alexander A. C. Cornells to 
Benjamin Hawkins, June 22, 1813, pp. 202-205; see also Augusta Chronicle, 
July 2, 1813. 
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of restiveness among the Creeks. At any rate, he informed Governor 
Mitchell that the Lower Creeks, who were responsible for the punishment 
of the murderers of the whites, had been attacked. Hawkins, who had 
persuaded the chiefs to punish the killers, reported that he too was to 
"suffer the hatchet." 
Governor Mitchell, who also kept in close contact with Indian 
affairs, had been informed of the uprising. Upon receipt of Hawkins' 
letter, Mitchell, fearing that the war would spread to Georgia, 
immediately offered to aid the Lower Creeks by furnishing Georgia militia¬ 
men. "In view of the circumstances," the governor told Hawkins, "Georgia 
_ lU 
can and is willing to afford the /Lcwer Creeks/ necessary aid." 
Mitchell's willingness to assist the Lower Creeks was more than 
mere compassion he may have felt for them. He knew that the tranquility 
of the state depended on the defeat of the Upper Creeks who had "taken 
up the tomahawk." Furthermore, he was besieged by demands for protection 
from inhabitants living along the Indian border who were forced to flee 
their homes for the safety of the interior of the state. The governor 
knew also that if aid in the form of militia were given promptly to the 
Lower Creeks, the Upper Creeks could be defeated without too great a 
loss of life to Georgians. Of even greater importance was the fact that 
the governor saw an opportunity to rid the state of Creek occupancy of 
choice lands without the necessity of negotiating treaties of purchase. 
^Governor David Byrdie Mitchell to Benjamin Hawkins, June 26, 
1813, in Governor's Letter Book A, 1809-181U, pp. 120-121, Georgia 
Department of Archives and History, Atlanta. (Hereinafter cited as 
Letter Book A.) 
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Mitchell knew that if he could convince the federal government that the 
hostilities between the Upper and Lower Creeks were more than a civil 
war, that behind the hostility lay British aid and encouragement, and 
that the Upper Creeks intended to attack the state, the Secretary of 
War would immediately order the Georgia militia into action to quell the 
Indians. Under these circumstances, no doubt the federal government 
would then force the Creeks to cede their lands as retribution for their 
part in the conflict. Thus Georgia would achieve a long sought-after 
goal. Before Mitchell could accomplish this objective, however, he had 
to reckon with Hawkins. 
Despite Georgia's offer of aid to the Lower Creeks, Hawkins 
refused. The Indian aeent would not admit that the battles between the 
two Indian factions were anything more than a civil war thus requiring no 
interference from Georgia. Apparently he believed that the Creeks would 
not invade or attack property in the state. Consequently, until Hawkins, 
as an agent of the United States government, admitted that the state was 
in imminent danger of an attack, Georgia was powerless to act, for under 
the provisions of the federal Constitution, a state could not without 
the consent of Congress "engage in war unless actually invaded, or in 
such imminent danger as will not admit of delay." This Hawkins would 
not do, and continued to spurn Georgia's offer of assistance, insisting 
that the Indian uprising was a civil war. Mitchell, much to his chagrin, 
was forced to wait for positive authorization to send Georgia militia 
into Indian territory. 
The refusal of Hawkins to accept aid from Georgia brought down a 
storm of abuse upon him. The editor of the Augusta Chronicle, noting 
the turbulent conditions on the frontier, declared that it was 
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"distressing to see settlers on the frontier abandoning their homes 
and crops ... to seek that security in the interior of the state which 
ought to be afforded them at home—but such is the will of Col. 
Hawkins. . . It is not entirely clear why the Indian agent refused 
the governor's proffered aid unless he was inclined to discount the 
fears of the Lower Creeks or whether he felt that his influence was 
sufficient to stop hostilities. His critics blamed his procrastination 
on his being jealous of Governor Mitchell and his unwillingness to share 
the credit for subduing the Indians.^ 
Mitchell did not deem it advisable to wait until an actual 
invasion of the state occurred before taking action. On July 23, he 
wrote John Armstrong, the Secretary of War, in whose office Indian 
affairs were handled, that the Indians were in a state of civil war and 
that "the ultimate object of the war party is avowedly to cut off the 
Indians who are friendly to us and then attack the frontiers of Georgia." 
In view of this peril, Mitchell requested authority from Armstong to call 
out the militia to assist the Lower Creeks should it become necessary. 
Before his letter reached Washington, the governor received a 
directive from the Secretary of War, who had been informed of the Creek 
uprising by Hawkins, calling for fifteen hundred militiamen to march 
against the "rampaging Creeks." John Armstrong informed Mitchell that 
^Augusta Chronicle, July 30, 1813. 
l^Merrill Bloodworth Pound, Benjamin Hawkins, Indian Agent 
(Athens} The University of Georgia Press, 1951), p. 
^Governor David Byrdie Mitchell to John Armstrong, July 23, 
1813, in Letter Book A, p. 129. 
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troops from Tennessee and the Third Regiment of the United States 
Infantry were to act in consort with Georgia. The Secretary further 
informed Mitchell that he had sent a copy of his communication to 
Governor Willie Blount of Tennessee and suggested to Mitchell that he 
and Blount work cut details on a point of rendezvous between the militia 
n O 
of the two states. Mitchell immediately wrote the Tennessee governor 
requesting advice concerning a strategic location for assembling the 
19 
troops. 
In the interim, Mitchell received important information from 
Hawkins. The Indian agent reported that all available evidence indi¬ 
cated that the war among the Upper and Lower Creeks "had originated with 
the British" and that the British were arming the Upper Creeks through 
the Spanish governor at Pensacola. Hawkins reported that a large 
number of Upper Creeks had visited Pensacola in July and had received 
arms and ammunition from British stores. Under these circumstances, 
Hawkins told the governor that he should regard his letter as "authentic 
infoimation of a mediated attack on the frontiers of Georgia." 
Mitchell acted quickly. He issued a call for volunteers and 
assiduously made preparations for the pending expedition into Creek terri¬ 
tory. Major-General John Floyd was appointed to command the militia. 
John Armstrong to Governor David Byrdie Mitchell, July 13, 
1813, in David Mitchell File, Georgia Department of Archives and History, 
Atlanta. 
^Governor David Byrdie Mitchell to Willie Blount, July 29, 
1813, in Letter Book A, p. 133. 
20 Benjamin Hawkins to Governor David Byrdie Mitchell, in Augusta 
Chronicle, November 6, 1813. 
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As the militia slowly mobilized for the Indian campaign, a sharp 
difference of opinion developed between Georgia's governor and the 
United States Indian agent over the conduct of Indian affairs. On 
July 28, a delegation of Lower Creek chiefs, impatient at Hawkins' delay 
in sending assistance, made a direct appeal to Governor Mitchell for 
reenforcements, pointing out that the Upper Creeks were plundering and 
burning their villages and murdering members of their group. The 
Georgia governor promised the delegation that he would send troops 
21 to their aid and encouraged them to continue fighting. When Hawkins 
heard of the governor's offer, he wrote Mitchell, insisting that the 
Indians' reports of atrocities had been exaggerated. Furthermore, 
Hawkins was of the opinion that the governor had gone beyond his authority 
in offering aid. "I have no right to question the purity of your motives, 
or the soundness of your political principles, but believing as I do, 
that the General government have exclusively the right to manage all 
affairs with the Indians, I am of the opinion," said Hawkins, "that 
all communications should be through their agency for Indian affairs." 
Mitchell differed sharply with the Indian agent. It was his opinion that 
a state government, and particularly Georgia, had a right to communicate 
with the Indians, independent of the federal government or its Indian 
agency. The present relations between Georgia and the Creek Indians, 
he said, presented such an occasion. Defiantly, Mitchell informed the 
^Governor David Byrdie Mitchell to Big Warrior, Little Prince, 
and Tustemugee of Tookanhatchee Chiefs, July 29, 1813, in Letter Book A, 
p. 132. 
22 Benjamin Hawkins to David Byrdie Mitchell, in Augusta Chronicle, 
December 10, 1813. 
9b 
Indian agent that he would continue to correspond with the Indians 
upon all occasions when, in his judgment, the interest of Georgia 
21 
would be served. While Hawkins continued his contest with the 
governor over the exclusive right of the United States to regulate 
Indian affairs, he made no further protests against Georgia's right to 
invade Indian country in the existing crisis. 
While the debate with Hawkins continued through correspondence, 
Governor Mitchell continued preparations for reenforcing the Lower 
Creeks. He was forced to wait upon supplies and equipment from the 
federal government as Georgia did not possess many of the essential 
items necessary for the expedition. While waiting upon these supplies, 
Mitchell ordered Brigadier General David Blackshear of Laurens County 
to the frontier in order to allay the fears of the people living along 
the border. Blackshear was instructed to adopt necessary measures to 
provide security for the frontier settlers. To expedite the orders, 
Blackshear directed three forts to be built in each of the counties 
of Twiggs and Telfair and four in Pulaski. These fortresses, located 
about ten miles apart, were one hundred feet square with two blockhouses 
and were enclosed with a stockade eight feet high. One subaltern, one 
sergeant, one corporal and fifteen privates were sent to each fort and 
two horsemen from each installation were to patrol the frontier between 
each of the forts. Despite these preparations, Georgians remained 
^Governor David Byrdie Mitchell to Benjamin Hawkins, August 17, 
1813, in Letter Book A, p. 111. 
^^David Blackshear to Governor David Byrdie Mitchell, August 13, 
1813, in Stephen Franks Miller, Memoirs of General David Blackshear 
(Philadelphia: J. B. Lippencott and Company, 185B), p. 112. 
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concerned throughout the suramer and fall of 1813, fearing that the state 
would be turned into a "blood-bath" by the warring Upper Creeks. 
Mitchell informed the Secretary of War on Ausrust 9, that he 
had ordered fifteen hundred militiamen to the frontier by authority 
granted in the Secretary's letter of July 13. These men, he told 
Armstrong, were anxious to fight the Creeks but lack of ammunition and 
equipment prevented immediate action. He reiterated the need for 
immediate federal assistance in supplying the militia with the necessary 
items. Mitchell further informed Armstrong that Georgia's situation had 
become critical as the Upper Creeks had defeated a large number of 
Lower Creeks at Coweta and were expected to move to an attack of the 
25 
frontier settlements of Georgia. 
The immediacy of the situation dictated that the militia be 
enlarged. Time would not permit obtaining authorization from the 
Secretary of War to increase the number, and so Mitchell, exceeding his 
authority, increased the militia from fifteen hundred to two thousand. 
To supply these additional troops, the governor recalled arms which 
previously had been issued to other militia throughout the state. 
While Georgia was making plans for the Creek invasions, Governor 
Willie Blount of Tennessee responded in mid-August to Mitchell's request 
of July 29 for cooperation on the Indian expedition. Blount explained 
his hesitancy to organize troops without specific orders from the War 
Department.^ 
^Governor David Byrdie Mitchell to John Armstrong, August 9, 
1813, in Letter Book A, pp. 137-138. 
^Augusta Chronicle, December 31» 1813. 
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Mitchell was extremely disappointed over Blount's refusal to 
act immediately in consort with Georgia against the Indians. Yet, 
Mitchell could still use Tennessee's negative action to an advantage. 
He had gone beyond the orders of the Secretary of War by calling out an 
additional five hundred militiamen. Among other things, the governor 
was concerned as to whether the federal government would reimburse the 
State of Georgia for these troops. Now, with Tennessee refusing to send 
reenforcements surely the War Department, aware of the Indian threat 
to Georgia, would look more favorably upon his actions whereby he 
ordered an additional five hundred men into service, bringing the total 
to 2500.27 
In the frustration of preparing the state for the Creek expedi¬ 
tion, Governor Mitchell found some encouraging results. Despite the 
lack of funds and supplies, there had been no lack of volunteers for 
the expedition. Militia companies in Augusta, ELberton, Greensboro and 
Sparta reported more volunteers than they were authorized to accept. 
Georgians were apparently anxious to fight. 
The eagerness for battle which Georgia troops exhibited when they 
assembled at Fort Hawkins on August 21, soon gave way to despair. For 
two months 2500 militiamen waited poised on the Indian border, eager to 
fight, but unable to move due to lack of equipment and supplies. The 
limited, rationed supplies, the illnesses of frontier camp life combined 
^"^David Byrdie Mitchell to John Armstrong, August 2U, 1813, in 
Letter Book A, p, lU3* The 2500 troops consisted of 500 cavalry, 
100 artillery, 150 riflemen and 1750-1800 infantry. 
with the weeks of idleness resulted in an alarming discontent among 
28 
the untrained and undisciplined militia. 
While the militia waited impatiently at Fort Hawkins for 
additional supplies, Indians attacked Fort Mims on August 30, 1813. 
Some 5^0 people had taken refuge in the fort, located on the Tensaw 
River, 35 miles above Mobile. Despite the fact that notice of the 
Indians' approach had been given two days in advance, the gate to the 
fort had been left open. One thousand "screaming Indians," with arms 
provided by the Spanish at Pensacola, were inside the fort before the 
gate could be closed. After a bloody battle of more than three hours, 
the fort fell. It is estimated that only fifteen white men, along 
with a few Negroes, escaped. All others, including women and children, 
were murdered, scalped and their bodies horribly mutilated. It was 
29 
reported that the Indians carried 250 scalps on poles to Pensacola. 
With the destruction of Fort Mims, the Creek uprising now became 
a general war. The Indians, in a hi^i state of excitement, wreaked 
havoc over the country, burning the deserted houses, destroying crops 
and murdering every white man with whom they came in contact. The 
crisis seized attention of the nation and especially in Georgia because 
of the state's close proximity to Fort Mims. 
Georgians took a grim view of the massacre. Not only the Indians 
who had perpetrated the assnalt, but also the Spanish who had furnished 
28 
Captain Philip Cook to William Jones, September 6, 1813, in 
William Jones Papers, Folder 3, Georgia Historical Society, Savannah. 
^Augusta Chronicle, October 1, 1813; see also Adams, History, 
VII, 229-230. 
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the savages with arms must be punished, declared the editor of the 
Milledgeville Georgia Journal on September 22j "the practice of the 
Spaniards in supplying the Indians with munitions of war, is an evil of 
no small magnitude—And one which calls loudly for the immediate inter¬ 
position of government."^ One week later, the same newspaper called 
upon the federal government to immediately avenge the deaths of "our 
31 butchered countrymen" and for the prompt "destruction of Spain." 
The government did act quickly. Urgent aopeals for troops were 
sent to the governors of Louisiana, Georgia and Tennessee. Georgia was 
already mobilizing for war and now the aid of Tennessee could be counted 
upon. Andrew Jackson, still bed ridden from a gunshot wound received in 
a duel with Thomas Hart Ben ton, was placed in command of an army of 
2$00 infantry and 1000 cavalry. By the time his troops had assanbled, 
Jackson had sufficiently recuperated to take to the field. He quickly 
moved into the heart of Creek country to begin the difficult task of 
32 
subduing the Upper Creeks. 
Governor Mitchell was anxious for troops of Georgia to join 
Jackson also, but federal funds still had not arrived. Perplexed as 
he was, Mitchell was further disturbed by frequent reports from 
General John Floyd, commander of the troops, that the militiamen at 
^Milledgeville Georgia Journal, September 22, 1813. 
31Ibid., September 29, 1813. 
32Andrew Jackson to Governor Peter Early, October 10. 1813, in 
John Spencer Bassett, Corresjoqndence of Andrew Jackson, l8lh-l8U5, 7 
Volumes (Washington: Carnegie Institute, 1926-1935), I, 331. (Herein¬ 
after cited as Bassett, Jackson Correspondence.) This letter is 
erroneously addressed to Governor Early. Early was not elected 
Governor of Georgia until November 5, 1813. 
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Fort Hawkins were growing restless. Some had deserted, and over 250 
had become ill. The governor, alarmed by the growing impatience of 
the troops, sent a steady barrage of letters to Washington demanding 
that Georgia's troops be fbmished adequate supplies without further 
delay. He asked George Michael Troup, Congressman from Georgia, to 
investigate the delay of funds and to use his influence to expedite 
their release. Troup informed Mitchell that the federal government had 
authorized the funds for the expedition tut that the state's delay in 
receiving them was apparently due to the negligence of the civilian 
contractor.^ 
Finally on September 26, the governor received $20,000 from the 
War Department to contract for supplies. Floyd's troops, after two 
months delay, entered Creek territory on October 19, constructing 
forts and blockhouses for defense as they advanced. 
Less than three weeks after Floyd's army moved into Creek country, 
Governor Mitchell's two-year term of office exoired on November U, 1813. 
He had decided not to seek reelection, giving as the reason that a 
"rotation in office ... ought to prevail.No doubt he had hoped to 
report to the legislature when it convened in November, 1813, that the 
Creek expedition had been successfully terminated. It would have been a 
fitting climax to a progressive, but frustrating four years. Circum¬ 
stances, however, prevented it. 
^George Michael Troup to Governor David Byrdie Mitchell, 
October 11, 1813, in Troup Papers, Georgia Department of Archives and 
History, Atlanta. 
Journal of the Senate of the General Assembly of Georgia 
(1813), p. 13* (hereinafter ciled as Georgia Senate Journal.) 
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In the annual message to the legislature, he outlined the many 
problems which had confronted him during the past summer. Particularly 
frustrating to Mitchell had been the inability to send troops into 
action at the first notice of an Indian uprising, the refusal of the 
Governor of Tennessee to initially cooperate with Georgia, and the 
difficulty of supplying the militia. 
Stepping down from the governorship, Mitchell saidt "I am well 
aware that the present moment is a very unfavorable one for a change, and 
I shall have felt reluctance in making a determination to withdraw if T 
had not at the same time felt assured that you had it in your power to 
obtain the services of a gentleman, whose talents and integrity eminently 
"it 
qualify him for the station. . . 
Peter Early, a Republican of the Jeffersonian school and a close 
friend of William Harris Crawford, was elected governor by a joint 
session of the Georgia Legislature on November U, 1013, over his 
36 
opponent, John Clark. No entry of the vote was recorded in either the 
Georgia Senate Journal or House Journal, only the notation that "both 
^Georgia Senate Journal (1813), p. 13. 
Although Georgia had only one national party in 1813, that which 
followed the principles of Thomas Jefferson, there were two factions in 
state politics. These two groups fought bitterly for years for public 
offices. One of these factions was led by John Clark and the other by 
William Harris Crawford. The citizens of Georgia generally aligned 
themselves with one or the other group. The followers of Crawford 
continued the tradition of the Federalists, representing the aristo¬ 
cratic tradition, while the Clark faction claimed to represent the cause 
of the small farmer and frontiersman. The feud, which raged for nearly 
twenty years, became a personal grudge when Clark and Crawford fought a 
duel in which the latter was wounded in the left wrist. Ulrich Bonnell 
Phillips, Georgia and State Rights (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1902), pp. 9U-105# (Hereinafter cited as Phillips, Georgia 
and State Rights.) 
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branches proceeded by joint ballot to the election, and on counting 
the votes, it appeared that the Hon. Peter Early was duly elected 
Governor of the state of Georgia." Early, who was Judge of the 
Ocnrulgee Circuit of the Georgia bench at the time of his election, was 
well qualified for the office of governor. He was a capable lawyer, 
and had served in the House of Representatives of the United States in 
1801, 1803 and 1805. His conduct on the bench was "exemplary," and 
his "firmness and knowledge of the law and impartiality had earned him 
38 
respect and admiration." 
Upon assuming the office of governor, Early was confronted with 
the serious situation of furnishing supplies for FT-oyd's troops. There 
was a lack of funds in the state treasury to pay for the needed supplies, 
and the $20,000 which had been received from the federal government 
in September was exhausted. As a result, Floyd's progress in the Creek 
nation had been halted at Fort Lawrence on the Flint River. Aware of 
Floyd's desperate situation. Governor Early recommended to the legislature 
that a loan be contracted Immediately. The legislature responded to 
19 
the governor's request, voting on November 12 to borrow $20,000. This 
money, obtained from the Bank of Augusta, was borrowed for a period of 
120 days.^0 With fresh supplies made possible by the loan, Floyd, after 
37Georgia Senate Journal (1813), p. 16. 
3®Thomason, "Early," 223. 
39Georgia Senate Journal (1813), pp. 35, 36. 
k^The state was reimbursed by the United States government in 
the following January. Georgia Senate Journal (1815), p. 5. 
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considerable delay, marched on to the Chattahoochee River where 
he constructed Fort Mitchell, named in honor of the former governor, as 
a supply base from which to operate against the Creeks. 
As Floyd moved into the center of the Uoper Creek country, new 
terror spread over Georgia in late fall of 1813. A party of Upper 
Creek Indians attacked the frontier of Morgan County on November 6, 
killing eight white settlers. The Indians were pursued by militia but 
not overtaken. This act greatly alarmed Georgians living in the western 
counties, and considerable pressure was exerted on the legislature to 
pass a joint resolution requiring the governor to call out and station 
detachments of the militia along the frontier. The legislature responded 
to this demand and further directed the erection of a series of block¬ 
houses in the western counties. In addition, the legislature authorized 
the raising of a maximum of one thousand troops for a period of fifteen 
to thirty days to destroy the Upper Creek towns adjacent to the 
frontier.^" Major-General David Adams of Jasper County was appointed 
commander of the expedition. 
The militia, consisting of 530 volunteers assembled near Monticello, 
in Jasper County, during the latter part of November. The governor, fear¬ 
ing that the men if detained too long might become restless and disorderly, 
wrote Adams on December 7, suggesting that his troops begin operation as 
quickly as possible. Adams, determined to punish everyone of the 
"ruthless savages," began to march from Camp Patriotism westward toward 
the Chattahoochee River on December 9. His objectives were the Creek 
^•Georgia Senate Journal (1813), pp. 23, 29-30, 36. 
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towns of Newyaucau, Takabatchee, Tallahassee and Immookfau, all in the 
ho 
vicinity of the Tallapoosa River. 
Adams' troops crossed the Chattahoochee on December 1^, but due 
to continual rain and high water, he was forced to postpone his plan 
of destroying the Upper Creeks. Returning to Jasper County on 
Christmas eve, Adams reported to Governor Early that his troops had 
burned two or three abandoned Creek towns. He reported that he had 
sighted Indians on the west bank of the Tallapoosa River, but high water 
had prevented his troops from engaging them.^ 
While Adams' troops failed to come in contact with the enemy, 
there was no lack of activity for troops under General Floyd. Marching 
from Fort Mitchell, the militia under Floyd invaded the Creek country. 
On November 29, they attacked the village of Autossee, twenty miles 
above Hickory Ground, where Creek warriors a short time before had 
listened to the exhortations of Tecumseh. Artillery and bayonet charges 
were too much for the Creek warriors. After a fierce, bloody battle 
in which two hundred Indians were killed, the savages fled. Floyd's 
troops sustained a loss of only eleven dead. Both Floyd and his 
Adjutant General, Daniel Newnan, were wounded in addition to fifty-four 
militiamen. Again handicapped by lack of supplies and the numerous worded , 
Floyd, forced to retreat to Fort Mitchell, was unable to follow up his 
victory.^ 
^Thomason, "Early," 226-227. 
k^David Adams to Governor Peter Early, December 2h, 1813, in un¬ 
published Letters Relating to Georgia Military Affairs, 10 Volumes, III, 
316-321, Georgia Department of Archives and History, Atlanta. 
^Augusta Chronicle, December 10, 1813. 
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Late in January, I81I4, Floyd and his men recovered sufficiently 
enough to resume action against the Upper Creeks. Floyd moved his 
troops, numbering seventeen hundred men including four hundred Lower 
Creek allies, westward to destroy the town of Hoithlewule on the 
Tallapoosa. Pitching camp on January 27 at Calibee Creek, about fifteen 
miles from his objective, Floyd made final plans to attack the Upper 
Creek town. In the cold, pre-dawn hours of the following morning, Floyd's 
camp was surprised by some seven to eight hundred Upper Creek warriors, 
led by a British officer. The attack was repulsed, but the battle was 
costly to the Georgia militia. Floyd lost 22 killed and lli? wounded, 
the largest number of casualties that had yet occurred in the Indian 
war. The Indians "left thirty-seven dead on the field; from the 
effusion of blood and the number of head-dresses and war-clubs found 
in various directions, their loss must have been considerable independent 
of their wounded. 
The battle of Calibee Creek was in substance a defeat for Floyd. 
The general's troops, having volunteered for six months duty, had had 
their fill of Indian fighting. With the enlistment time coming to an 
end, they became so rebellious and decisive in their determination to 
return home, that Floyd was forced to abandon all his fortified posts 
and to fall back to the Chattahoochee, where he arrived February 1, four 
days after the battle. Governor Early was perturbed and dismayed with 
the unpatriotic conduct of Georgia militia. In a letter of February 8 
^Augusta Chronicle, December 10, 1813. 
^Louise Frederick Hayes, editor, unpublished Letters of Timothy 
Barnard, 178U-1820, p. 13, Georgia Department of Archives and History, 
Atlanta. 
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he wrote: "How melancholy will be the reflection, should our citizens 
fighting for the security of their own homes, and having so much glory, 
cover themselves at last with disgrace, by want of a few days more of 
perseverance. 
It was not Early's intentions to let the unruly ones escaoe: 
I shall feel it my duty to cause the offenders to be brought to 
a severe account, should they not have been previously tried. 
Should the troops contrary to our present hopes abandon their 
General & not wait to be discharged. I earnestly hope that all such 
may be returned as deserters & made to suffer all the privations and 
punishments due to such conduct.k? 
It is not clear whether any of the militiamen actually deserted Floyd's 
army or whether Early carried out his threat of punishment. Floyd did 
return to Milledgeville as quickly as possible, however, and the troops 
were discharged in early March. Georgia's participation in the Creek 
war thus came to an end. 
Mhile General Floyd had been plagued by problems throughout the 
Creek campaign, General Andrew Jackson had not been entirely free 
from similar incidents. Lack of supplies, trouble with rebellious 
troops, and twice beaten back by his fanatical adversaries, all 
contributed to the general's troubles. But Jackson was not to be dis¬ 
couraged from carrying out his plans of "exterminating" the Indians. 
Stubbornly and persistently he continued his onslaught against the TTuper 
Creeks until March 27, l8lLi, when he effectively broke their resistance 
in a bloody battle in a bend of the Tallapoosa, where the Indians had 
^Governor Peter Early to John Mclntosh, February 8, l8lLt, in 
Letter Book A, pp. 205-206. 
^Governor Peter Early to Major General Thomas Pinckney, 
February 7, l8lU, ibid., pp. 20li-205. 
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constructed a fortress. Approximately one thousand Indians, including 
| O 
women and children, had taken refuge in the enclosure for a last stand. 
Jackson, with about three thousand troops, arrived near Horseshoe 
Bend on the evening of March 26. He pitched camp six miles northwest 
of the site, and next morning attacked the Indian fortress. "Determined 
to exterminate them," he detached a force of seven hundred men and six 
hundred friendly Indians to surround the bend, while utilizing all of 
his infantry, Jackson took a position before the breastwork. At 10:30 
in the morning, he planted his cannon about two hundred yards from the 
center of the work, and began a rapid fire of artillery and musketry, 
which continued for two hours without producing any apparent effects. 
Meanwhile, Jackson's Cherokee allies swam the river in the rear of the 
Creek warriors and seized their canoes. With these canoes, two hundred 
of Jackson's troops were transported into the Horseshoe, trtiere they 
climbed the high ground to the rear of the Creeks. From this vantage 
ho 
point volley after volley was hurled against the surprised Creeks. 
The Creeks armed only with tomahawks and clubs were no match for 
the cold steel of the Americans wielded at close quarters. Some stood 
their ground bravely and were cut down, the majority broke and fled. 
Others tried to swim the river but while they were in mid-stream became 
targets for the sharpshooters on the banks. Some sought shelter under a 
bluff and refused to obey Jackson's command to surrender until the 
k®Adams, History, VII, 235-256. 
^Andrew Jackson to Governor Willie Blount, March 31, l8lU, 
in Bassett, Jackson Correspondence, I, U89-U92. 
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torch was applied and the Indians were smoked out of their hiding 
place.^ 
The battle was reduced to mass slaughter. Throughout the rest 
of the afternoon Jackson's troops occupied themselves with the task of 
rounding up and killing Indians and among them some of the squaws and 
children. Jackson expressed regret over the slaying of the non- 
combatants which, he said, was accidental. From the standpoint of 
the Indians, the Horseshoe engagement presented a tragic spectacle. Of 
the original one thousand, only two hundred remained alive. When 
compared to the victory achieved, the American losses were slight. The 
cost to Jackson was only 26 killed and 107 wounded, the Cherokee allies 
reported 18 killed and 36 wounded and the friendly Creeks had E> killed 
and 11 wounded.'1 
Jackson was satisfied that he had completely avenged Fort Mims. 
The Creeks had at last been conquered, but the victory was hardly to 
the credit of the United States. For six months approximately 3^00 
Creek warriors, inadequately equipped with guns and ammunition and 
dependent chiefly upon their bows and arrows, had defied 15,000 American 
regulars, volunteers and militia. The Creek war had cost the United 
States government thousands of dollars for food, pay and equipment. 
The real victory belonged to the British. For at the cost of a 
small quantity of powder and shot and a few weapons issued to the Indians 
^Andrew Jackson to Governor Willie Blount, March 31, l8lb, 
in Bassett, Jackson Correspondence, I, U89-U92. 
^Ibid. 
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at Pensacola by their Spanish allies, they had succeeded in distracting 
the attention of 15,000 troops that could have been put to more 
effective use elsewhere, particularly in the northwest. 
While Jackson was crushing the Creeks, the war in the northwest 
had not gone too well for the Americans. Hampered by a lack of an 
effective fighting force and a lack of money with which to conduct the 
war, together with fumbling generals, rebellious troops and the opposition 
of New Englanders^ to the war effort, the United States had suffered one 
set back after another. Fortunately for America, Great Britain, pre¬ 
occupied with her struggle against Napoleon, paid little attention to 
the American war in its beginning. In the fall of 1812, Napoleon 
launched the Russian campaign which before the winter was over brought 
him disaster and prepared the way for his ultimate defeat. As the 
months passed, Great Britain was able to divert more and more military 
and naval power to America. As a result of the overwhelming British 
military power, the United States met with defeat after defeat. 
The United States began the war with the avowed object of invad¬ 
ing and conquering Canada. A three-pronged invasion was planned to 
strike into Canada by way of Detroit, the Niagara River and Lake 
Champlain, with the greatest concentration of force at Detroit. At 
^The opposition in New England went to remarkable extremes. Some 
of the Federalists there celebrated British victories, sabotaged their 
own country's war effort and even plotted disunion and a separate peace. 
The embargo, the war and wartime restrictions bore down heavily on the 
commercial interest of the New England states and as a result New 
EngLanders openly violated the trade restrictions, carrying on trade with 
the British in Canada. Furthermore, New England banks refused to buy 
government bonds or to loan money desperately needed to keep soldiers 
in the field. In addition, New England authorities refused to allow 
state militia to take orders from the president or to fight outside the 
country. Adams, History, VIII, 1-20. 
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Detroit, however, the elderly General WLlliam Hull, Governor of 
Michigan Territory, retreated and surrendered the fort without firing 
a shot on August 16, 1812.^^ The other invasion efforts also failed, 
and Fort Dearborn fell before an Indian attack. 
There were a few American victories at sea in 1812 which kept 
citizens? hopes kindled. American frigates engaged British warships in a 
series of duels and won seme spectacular victories, one of the most 
renowned being the victory of the Constitution over the Guerrlere. 
American privateers destroyed or captured one British merchant ship 
after another. After the first year, however, the score was more than 
evened by the British navy, which not only drove the American frigates 
to cover but also instituted a close blockade of the United States and 
harassed the coastal settlements from Virginia to Maine.^ 
While British seapower dominated the ocean, American fleets 
arose to dispute control of the Great Lakes. First, the Americans took 
temporary command of Lake Ontario, enabling troops to cross over to 
York, the capitol of Canada. At York, on April 27, 1813, the invaders 
ran upon a land mine, which exploded killing more than fifty, including 
General Zebulon Montgomery Pike. Some of the enraged survivors, 
without authorization, set fire to the public buildings of the capitol, 
burning them to the ground. After destroying some ships and military 
stores, the Americans retreated across the lake.^ 
■Si 
Niles' Weekly Register, II (August 22, 1812), il3. 
^Francis F. Beime, The War of 1812 (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon 
Books, 1965), pp. 128-132. TPereTnaTter cited as Beime, War of 1812.) 
**"'Niles' Weekly Register, IV (May 15, 1813), 178-180. 
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Next, Lake Erie was redeemed for American use, mainly through the 
efforts of the youthful Oliver Hazard Perry. Having constructed a 
fleet, Perry took up a position at Put-in-Bay, near a group of islands 
off the mouth of the Maumee River. With the banner "Don't Give Up 
the Ship" flying on his flagship, he awaited the British fleet. On 
September 10, 1813, the fleet arrived and after a fierce battle in which 
both sides lost heavily in men killed and wounded. Perry established 
American control over the lake. 
Perry's victory made possible an invasion of Canada by way of 
Detroit. The post had been hard to reach overland, for supply wagons 
either had to struggle through the almost impassable Black Swamp of the 
Maumee Valley or had to make a long detour around it. After Perry's 
victory at Put-in-Bay, supplies as well as men could be quickly and 
easily transported by water. William Henry Harrison, who had replaced 
Hull in the Western command, pushed up the Thames River into Upper 
Canada and won a victory on October 5>j 1813. Although the Battle 
of the Thames resulted in no lasting occupation of Canadian soil, it did 
dishearten the Indians of the northwest, who had aligned themselves with 
the British, and eliminated the worst of the danger they had offered to 
the frontier. What small successes the United States managed to eke out 
against the British is 1813, however, were short-lived. 
By the spring of iSlU, British strategists had devised a master 
plan for crushing the weak military forces of the United States. One 
^Niles* Weekly Register, V (September 25, 1813), 60-61. 
^Ibid., V (October 23, 1813), 129-132; see also Beime, War of 
1812, pp.~2T5-219. 
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army, eleven thousand strong, was to march down from Montreal. Another, 
a much smaller amphibious force, was to make a feint at the Chesapeake 
Bay area, destroying coastal towns and threatening Washington and 
Baltimore. A third army was to assemble at Jamaica and sail to attack 
New Orleans and bottle up the West. 
While the British were implementing their plans for defeating the 
United States in the north. General Andrew Jackson in the south, pre¬ 
pared to deal the final crushing blow to the Creeks. Having suppressed 
the Upper Creeks' resistance at the Battle of Horseshoe Bend, the 
general, on August 9, l8lU, ordered them to capitulate. At the newly 
erected fort named in his honor, Jackson dictated terms of surrender to 
a Creek delegation. The Upper Creeks were absent from the negotiations. 
Those present represented the Lower Creeks who had helped to fight the 
Upper Creeks in the recent Indian canpaign. To these allies and friends 
Jackson presented a paper, originally intended for the Upper Creeks, 
requiring as indemnity for war expenses a surrender of two-thirds of 
their territory. They were required to withdraw from the southern 
and western half of Alabama, within the Chattahoochee on the east and 
to 
the Coosa on the west. The military objective of this policy was to 
isolate the Creeks from the Seminoles and Spaniards on one side, and 
from the Choctaws and Chickasaws on the other. 
Jackson apparently was not bothered by the legal problems of the 
treaty. Technically, the land belonged to the Upper and Lower Creeks, 
and as such neither faction was capable of making a treaty or srranting 
lands of the Creek nation. Furthermore, the Upper Creeks had fled and 
^Kappler, Indian Affairs, II, 107-109. 
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refused to negotiate and the Lower Creeks could hardly capitulate 
because they had never been at war against the United States. They had 
fought in the service of the United States and were entitled to rewards 
as allies, not to punishment as enemies. 
The Lower Creeks refused to accept the terms of the treaty. 
Jackson told than in reply that their refusal would show them to be 
enemies of the United States, that they might retain their part of the 
country, but that the part tfaich belonged to the Upper Creeks would be 
taken by the United States government. He further told the chiefs who 
would not consent to sign the paper that they could join the warring 
Indians at Peansacola, although Jackson added that he would probably 
overtake and destroy them before they could get there. These arguments 
were convincing. A number of the Lower Creeks, after stiff opposition, 
go 
signed the treaty. 
Although Jackson forced the Creeks to cede over twenty million 
acres of land to the United States, the people of Georgia were deeply 
disappointed over the terms of the treaty. They were chagrined over 
the failure of the federal government to remove the Creeks from all the 
rich lands included in Georgia's territory. They had entered the war 
with the expectation that the government would carry out promises made 
in 1802 to remove the Indians from Georgia. Instead, the Indians had 
been left in the center of Georgia and removed from the territory of 
Alabama, where the United States was under no obligation to act. Furthermore 
Adams, History, VII, 260-261. 
^Milledgeville Georgia Journal, Augu st 2U, l8lLu 
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Georgians regarded the ceded land as worthless. The territory, acquired 
by Georgia under the terms of the treaty, was principally pine lands 
and lay south of the ^Itamaha River, reaching from the western boundaries 
of the old original county of Wayne westward to the banks of the 
Chattahoochee River. 
The Milledgeville Georgia Journal reflected the disappointment 
of the people in an editorial on August 2k, l8lh. Pointing out that the 
federal government had failed to carry out its promise of 1802, the 
editor declared that, "It is believed that this state has strong claims 
on the General government, for the extinguishment, at this time, of the 
Indian claim to a large part, if not the whole of that valuable terri¬ 
tory." Furthermore, according to the editorial, the state of Georgia 
had been treated -unjustly by the United States. "Has justice been done 
to the state of Georgia," asked the editor, "by an agreement which does 
not merely withhold from her the present possessions of this territory, 
but places the acquisition of it at a period very remote?"^ 
The Georgia General Assembly in December registered further 
disappointment and disillusionment of the Fort Jackson treaty in a 
memorial addressed to the president. The citizens of Georgia, the 
memorial said, had hoped that the United States would have taken 
advantage of the victory over the Creeks to carry out the agreement made 
with Georgia in 1802. But as a matter of fact, Georgia had obtained 
little or no benefit from the treaty. Furthermore, the territory 
acquired was sterile and unprofitable. All the territory to which the 
6lMilledgeville Georgia Journal, August 2h, l8lU. 
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Creeks retained title lay in Georgia or very near its western boundary. 
The memorial concluded with a request that further cessions be 
62 
obtained immediately. 
However disappointed and frustrated over the lack of acquisition 
of Indian lands, the people of Georgia were deeply relieved to learn of 
cessation of hostilities in l8lU« Although there were occasional reports 
of Indian depredations, the frontier remained relatively quiet during 
the spring of l8lU. As the threat of an Indian invasion dissipated, 
fears among the populace subsided and Georgians began to resume their 
routine way of living. The tranquility was short-lived, however, for 
on May 7, l8lU, the Savannah Republican announced that a large British 
force was off the coast of Saint Marys and that an attack on Georgia 
was imminent.^ 
^Phillips, Georgia and State Rights, p. 52 
^Savannah Republican, May 7, l8lU. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE BATTLEFRONT COMES TO GEORGIA, l8lU-l8l5 
The announc«Bent that British ships had been sighted off the 
coast of Georgia in May, XBlIi, brought the reality of war hone to most 
Georgians. Thus far they had not been confronted by a British attack. 
They had viewed the fighting in the northern states between the United 
States and Great Britain as a remote struggle far from Georgia lands. 
Now with British ships hovering off the coast, the war was no longer 
something to read about hundreds of miles away, but a warning that 
Georgians might soon know the full impact of an invasion. 
A climate of anxiety resulted from the appearance of the British 
ships. Not only did the people fear a British invasion, but of equal 
concern was the possibility that the English would stir up the Indian 
savages again resulting in a repeat of the disaster at Fort Mims. The 
devastation accompanying the Creek war had not been forgotten. 
Georgians living along or near the coastal areas sent numerous 
appeals for protection to Governor Peter Early. These requests pointed 
out that from Savannah to Saint Marys, a distance of over a hundred 
miles, an extensive and an almost unprotected coastline with numerous 
water inlets, offered many vulnerable points for a successful British 
invasion. 
Governor Early acted promptly and ordered the entire militia to 
prepare to march at a'hioment's notice." He made available two thousand 
men to Major General Thomas Pinckney, United States Commander of the 
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Southern Army.^" He dispatched two regiments of militia to Savannah 
under the command of Major General John Floyd and directed Major General 
John Mclntosh to build fortifications along the southern coastline of 
Georgia. In addition, Daniel Newnan, the Adjutant General, issued an 
appeal for one thousand volunteers to bolster the small contingency of 
troops guarding the coast. At this juncture, the War Department, aware 
of the danger of a British invasion along the southern coast, ordered 
U50 regular troops to the Georgia seaboard. 
Savannah quickly assumed the appearance of an armed camp. 
Soldiers marched in and cut of the city, and the haste with which 
fortifications were going up produced both excitement and fear among 
the populace. Merchants and shopkeepers made preparations to transfer 
merchandise to safer locations in the interior of the state. Wagons, 
hired to convey the goods, jammed the streets and added to the confusion, 
noise and excitement.^ 
While Georgians prepared defenses, the British were not idle. 
Reaching the coast of Georgia in early May, landing parties went 
ashore on Amelia Island and posted proclamations exhorting Negro slaves 
to join them. The British promised the Negroes food, clothing and 
protection in return for support against their white masters. Other 
incentives were offered the slaves. Those Negroes who would go to 
Ehgland were promised free transportation where they were supposed to 
^Governor Peter Early to Major General Thomas Pinckney, May 19, 
l8lii, in Governor's Letter Book fi, 1809-181U, p. 3. (Hereinafter cited 
as Letter Book A.) 
2Milledgeville Georgia Journal, May 18, l8llu 
^Ibld. 
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to find a country ruled by a Negro Queen in which ladies preferred 
Negro men as husbands and the gentlemen preferred Negro women as wives. 
Under the spell of such alluring promises about three hundred Negroes 
deserted to the British.^ 
British agents also sought the cooperation of the Indians. On 
July 1, 181U, Vice-Admiral Alexander Cochrane sent Colonel Biward 
Nicholls with a detachment of officers to the Indian villages of West 
Florida. Admiral Cochrane sent two field pieces, two thousand guns 
and one thousand swords to West Florida and promised arms for every 
warrior who would fight the Americans. He urged the Indians to encourage 
the flight of Negroes from Georgia and the Carolinas and ordered Nicholls 
to clothe, supply and arm the slaves.^ 
Many of the Upper Creeks, whom Jackson had driven out of Georgia, 
and the Seminoles in Florida rallied to the British standard. The 
Indians gave Nicholls the title of commander-in-chief and urged Cochrane 
to maintain a British post on the Gulf. Indian chieftains assured 
Cochrane that they would enlist Negro warriors, unite the redmen and 
crush the "wicked and rebellious Americans."^ 
Colonel Benjamin Hawkins, United States Indian Agent, confirmed 
the action of the British relative to Negro slaves and hostile Indians. 
George Jones, Mayor of Savannah, to Governor Peter Early, May 7, 
l8lU, in Telamon Cuyler Collection, University of Georgia Library, Athens; 
George Baillie to William Jones, November 18, 1815, in William Jones 
Papers, Georgia Historical Society, Savannah. Baillie was a prisoner of 
the British on Saint Simons Insland in February, l8l!>. 
^Rembert Wallace Patrick, Florida Fiasco (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 195ii), p. 28?. (Hereinafter cited as Patrick, Fiasco.) 
6Ibid. 
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Hawkins informed Governor Early that British troops had landed at 
Pensacola and Apalachicola and armed the Indians. He told the chief 
executive that "intelligence" reports confirmed the British plan to 
attack Saint Marys and Savannah. As a result of Hawkins' report, 
Georgians anticipated an attack on the state momentarily. Governor 
Early, fearing resumption of Indian warfare, immediately dispatched 
g 
four companies of militia to the frontier. Early also sought the 
cooperation of the Lower Creeks, hitherto friendly to Georgia, and 
suggested to Hawkins that an attempt be made to persuade the Indians to 
join in alliance with Georgians. The Lower Credos, whose settlements 
were located above the junction of the Flint and Chattahoochee rivers, 
met with the Indian agent at Fort Mitchell in July. They professed 
friendship and promised to join in any enterprise against the warring 
9 
Seminoles and Upper Creeks. 
Although neither Indian warfare nor a British invasion occurred 
during the latter half of iSllt, Georgians, nonetheless, spent the summer 
and fall in a state of suspense and uncertainty. Tantalized by fear of 
the enemy hovering off the coast of Saint Marys, and alarmed by frequent 
rumors of Indian atrocities, they lived under fear of an attack by 
British troops, by the Indians, or a revolt of Negro slaves. 
The fear was well founded. Militarily, the state was inadequately 
prepared to ward off an invasion by veteran British troops. With a 
^Milledgeville Georgia Journal, July 22, l8lln 
8Ibld. 
9Ibid.. July 20, l8lU. 
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shoreline of over a hundred miles to protect and an extensive Indian 
border to patrol, a poorly equipped and an inadequately trained militia 
as well as a depleted treasury, Georgia's military position remained 
critical throughout the war of 1812, 
There had been attempts to provide adequate fortifications in 
the state. Savannah, the principal port city in Georgia, received 
immediate attention upon the declaration of war. Because of her 
importance as a port and the close proximity to the Atlantic Ocean, 
Savannah appeared to be the most vulnerable point for a successful 
invasion. Furthermore, British control of the city would give the 
enemy access to the interior of Georgia and South Carolina by way of the 
Savannah River. Because of these dangers, a committee was appointed 
and directed to erect fortifications in the vicinity of Savannah. Fort 
Wayne, built in 1760 on a sand bluff overlooking the harbor, was 
renovated in 1812-1813. Records do not indicate the extent of renova¬ 
tions, but the Savannah Republican called for fifty thousand bricks to 
"buttress the fort."'*'0 In addition, volunteers in row boats were 
stationed at the mouth of the several water inlets in and around the 
city to sound alarm should the British attempt a landing. A small 
l" 
contingency of 160 United States troops was also stationed in the city. 
The Georgia General Assembly, meeting in 1812, authorized the 
governor to station a full company of militia in each of the counties 
^Savannah Republican and Evening Ledger, June 22, 29, 1812. 
(Hereinafter cited as SavannaH Republican.) 
^Tbid., June 23, 1812; Journal of the Senate of the General 
Assembly ot Georgia (1813), p. HT H^erelnafter citetT"as Georgia Senate 
Journal 7) 
120 
bordering on the coast, but Governor David Byrdie Mitchell, insisting 
that the British would not attack Savannah, did not order them into 
service. Mitchell's reasons for discounting the possibility of a 
British attack on Savannah were based on his belief that large boats 
could not navigate the Savannah River, and that the British would not 
12 
hazard a small boat landing. 
The legislature, in December, 1812, upon recommendation of 
Governor Mitchell, appropriated $30,000 for the defense of Savannah, 
but insufficient funds in the state treasury prevented the expenditures. 
This created much anxiety and resulted in protests from the citizens of 
Savannah, who accused Governor Mitchell of neglecting to provide the 
city with adequate protection. Mitchell infomed Savannah's Mayor George 
Jones, who had written him for state assistance, that he could not expend 
money which was not available. Although the legislature had appropriated 
funds for the defense of the city, Mitchell reported that the legislators 
had left him with only $12,000 in the treasury. Vfith this amount he 
had to make payment on a note at the Planters Bank for state obligations 
and pay for twelve hundred swords, five hundred rifles and an undisclosed 
amount of ammunition. Perplexed as to what he could do, Mitchell assured 
Jones that he would attempt to provide security for the city.1^ 
The govemor wrote George Michael Troup, Congressman from Georgia, 
on June 18, 1813, that Savannah and the state were inadequately fortified, 
Govemor David Byrdie Mitchell to John Mclntosh, June 13, 1813, 
in Letter Book P, p. 110. 
^Governor David Byrdie Mitchell to George Jones, June 17, 1813, 
in Letter Book A, p. 112. 
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and requested assistance in obtaining immediate federal aid. Mitchell 
asked that the number of troops stationed in Savannah and along the 
coast be increased. He explained that there were only two companies 
of soldiers quartered in Savannah, while General Pinckney, who had 
established headquarters at Point Petre, had a force of one thousand. 
Mitchell asked that a part of Pinckney's troops be moved to fortifica¬ 
tions along the Georgia seaboard."^ 
While apprehensions over the unprotected coastline continued, the 
Creek war temporarily diverted the attention of Georgia's citizens 
during most of the year of 1813 and the early months of l8lU. The 
appearance of British ships off the Georgia coast in the spring of l8lli 
brought once again the possibility of a British invasion. 
During the summer and fall Georgians watched as the British 
wreaked havoc along the Chesapeake area, reducing coastal towns to 
ashes. They read with disbelief and disgust about the capture of 
Washington and the burning of the principal governmental buildings. A 
state of anxiety prevailed as a naval squadron sailed from the Chesapeake, 
and the citizenry expressed relief in the report that the fleet moved 
around Florida and into the Gulf. But the people of Georgia continued 
to view their situation as critical. Alarmed that Savannah would suffer 
the same fate as the Chesapeake area, citizens of the city called a town 
meeting on September 28 to discuss means of protecting Savannah against 
an invasion. After lengthy debates, a vigilance committee was appointed 
with the responsibility of keeping the citizenry informed of British 
l^Governor David Byrdie Mitchell to George Michael Troup, June 18, 
1813, in Letter Book A, pp. Il£-ll6. 
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activities off the coast and of any indication of a British attempt to 
invade the city. Bulletins on the state of affairs were to be issued 
daily and the number of ships off the coast were to be kept under sur¬ 
veillance. The vigilance committee was directed to secure the names of 
all able-bodied men in and around Savannah who were not enrolled in 
military corps or who refused to assist in erecting fortifications."^ 
Savannahians agreed that such laxity among the populace would not be 
tolerated. Citizens called on Governor Early to "throw into the city 
. . . a force that would effectively protect them."^ They issued an 
appeal to Georgians for volunteers to aid in the defense of Savannah and 
by January, I8l5, "several hundred" up-country Georgians responded to 
the appeal. 
The citizens of Savannah also attempted to raise money for defense 
of their city by soliciting voluntary contributions. This project 
failed for want of sufficient contributors, and again Savannahians 
appealed to the governor. Early was still without funds and the 
legislature was not in session but he believed that he must act quickly 
in an effort to allay the fears of the people. The governor personally 
borrowed the necessary funds from the Planters Bank in Savannah with 
which to complete the fortifications of the port city.^-''' When the 
1^ Savannah Republican, September 29, l8llu 
l6M athew McAllister to Governor Peter Early, September 29, l8lU, 
in Louise Frederick Hayes, unpublished Indian Letters, 1782-1839, p. 72, 
Georgia Department of Archives and History, Atlanta. 
■^Georgia Senate Journal (l8llj), p. 6. 
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General Assembly convened In October, the legislators immediately 
sanctioned the governor's actions, appropriating funds to repay the 
loan. 
While Early was attempting to fortify Savannah and the Georgia 
coast, James Monroe, who had replaced John Armstrong as Secretary of 
War, ordered Governor Early to organize, arm and equip 2^00 militia to 
join Major General Andrew Jackson at Mobile. During the Creek campaign, 
Jackson had not lost sight of what he considered to be the main threat 
to the safety of the southern United States, the possibility that the 
British might establish bases in Spanish Florida and unite the Indians. 
As soon as he completed the treaty with the Creeks at Fort Jackson, 
General Jackson marched to Mobile where his fears were confirmed. He 
learned on August 15 that British troops had arrived at Pensacola, in 
West Florida, and were arming and training the Upper Creeks with the 
intention of sending them against Georgia's frontier settlements. The 
general, fearing a renewal of Indian warfare, kept a close watch on 
British activities at Pensacola while preparing the Mobile area for a 
British invasion. Believing that Mobile could be the next point for a 
British attack, Jackson' dispatched 160 men to strengthen Fort Bowyer on 
the end of a sand pit guarding the entrance to the bay, 30 miles below 
Mobile.^ 
Jackson's precautions were not premature for on September 12, a 
British force landed to the rear of the fort. Three days later an 
^Andrew Jackson to Secretary of War James Monroe, September 5, 
l8lU, in John Spencer Bassett, Correspondence of Andrew Jackson, l8lh- 
18U5, 7 Volumes (Washingtont Carnegie Institute, 1926-1935), II, U2. 
(Hereinafter cited as Bassett, Jackson Correspondence.) 
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assault on the fortress ended in a bloody battle in which the British 
lost 162 killed and 72 wounded* Jackson's losses were slight, four were 
killed and four wounded* Badly beaten, the remainder of the British 
squadron withdrew to Pensacola.^ 
As the British retreated, Jackson massed his forces north of 
Mobile where he awaited authorization from Washington to invade Spanish 
territory. Permission never came and in order to thwart British activi¬ 
ties at Pensacola, Jackson decided that Pensacola must be reduced without 
further delay. He drafted a letter to the Secretary of War on October 26 
explaining his plans for an attack on Pensacola, pointing out that he 
was cognizant of the fact he would be acting without sanction of the 
government.^ 
With a force of three thousand, Jackson stormed the Spanish town 
on November 7, forcing the British to flee. After driving the Creeks and 
Seminoles, who had taken refuge there, into the swamps, Pensacola fell to 
his, command. While Jackson dictated surrender terms to the Spanish 
governor, a letter forbidding action was dispatched by Monroe to 
Jackson. Monroe informed Jackson that it was the president's desire 
not to become involved in a war with Spain. Instead of wielding military 
force, Monroe said, the United States wished to deal with the Spanish 
21 governor at Pensacola through diplomatic channels. Monroe's 
19 Major General Andrew Jackson to Secretary of War James Monroe, 
September 17, Ifillj, in Bassett, Jackson Correspondence, TI, 50. 
20 Major General Andrew Jackson to Secretary of War James Monroe, 
October 26, l8llt, ibid., II, 82. 
21 
James Monroe to Major General Andrew Jackson, October 21, I81I4, 
ibid., II, 82. 
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letter arrived too late. The general had settled the grievances by 
force. 
Jackson explained his actions in the Pensacola campaign in a 
letter to Governor Early of Georgia as being "occasioned by the 
unprecedented conduct of the Governor of Pensacola, in harboring, aid- 
22 ing, and countenancing the British and their red allies." Although 
Jackson had exceeded his authority by invading the territory of a foreign 
country, Georgians applauded his actions. "The Spaniards have furnished 
the Indians with arms and encouraged them to attack Georgia, and 
Pensacola afforded them an asylum," declared the editor of the Milledge- 
ville Georgia Journal on December 7, and Jackson's conduct "is a 
circumstance which affords no just cause of regret on our part, but 
23 
rather of gratulation." Whether Jackson was right or wrong in the 
action he took against Pensacola was of no consequence to the citizens 
of Georgia. "Old Hickory" had defeated Georgia's ancient enemy and 
the people were grateful. 
While Jackson was subduing the British and Indians at Mobile 
and Pensacola, the State of Georgia continued making preparations to 
meet an invasion. Governor Early, believing that an attack on the state 
was imminent and in need of appropriations for defense, called the 
General Assembly into special session in October. When the lawmakers 
convened on October 17, Early requested that the legislators provide 
means for adequate preparations for war, pointing out that appropriations 
99 
Milledgeville Georgia Journal, December 7, iSlit. 
23Ibid. 
126 
were needed for defense projects along the coastal area. Difficulty 
with mutinous troops in the past prompted the chief executive to request 
reorganization of the militia. He emphasized the need for better 
organization and better discipline of the troops. The method of elect¬ 
ing officers, in his opinion, had proven to be inadequate. He believed 
that officers elected hy men whom they commanded produced insubordination 
and was injurious to the officers. Calling for prompt action on the part 
of the legislators, the governor declared: "Our system has been calcu¬ 
lated for a peace establishment. It is high time that one should be 
2b 
substituted . . . for a state of War." 
Governor Early then issued an address to the citizens of Georgia 
in which he recounted the atrocities which the British had committed 
upon the former English colonies. These were occasioned by jealousies 
toward the United States, he said, caused by her growing commercial and 
naval power. Referring to the devastation along the Chesapeake area, 
the chief executive declared that such practices would create animosities 
which ages could not erase. The Jbnerican child, he predicted, would 
learn in his cradle to "abhor the British name, and the lesson will be 
2S handed down from generation to generation." 
The people sanctioned the governor's statements. The editor of 
the Milledgeville Georgia Journal declared that the governor's address 
was "precisely such a document as the times call for. It is concise 
^Georgia Senate Journal (l8lh), p. 5 
2hbid,, pp. 6, 7. 
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and energetic—breathes an indignant spirit of resentment at the 
26 
atrocious conduct of the enemy. ..." 
The General Assembly also concurred with the chief executive. 
In response to Early's plea for placing Georgia in the best possible 
state of military readiness, the legislature passed a measure which 
authorized the governor to appoint Major and Brigadier Generals, field 
and company officers according to seniority. In addition, $1jE>,000 was 
appropriated for the defense of Savannah and $10,000 for Saint Marys 
and other intermediate points along the coast.^ 
While the legislators wrestled with the problems of preparing 
Georgia for war. Early directed final preparations for sending troops to 
General Jadeson at Mobile. The chief executive ordered 2^00 Georgia 
militia to convene at Fort Hawkins on November 21, and tendered command 
of the expedition to General John Mclntosh. In the midst of preparations, 
the governor was again confronted with the perplexing problem of 
inadequate supplies. The militia had been called into service initially 
by order of the Secretary of War, therefore, these troops were technically 
under command of the United States and as such it was the responsibility 
of the central government to furnish than with supplies. The United 
States Army Quartermaster at Savannah was destitute of both supplies and 
funds, consequently the state of Georgia must provide the troops with 
the needed equipment if there were to be immediate protection. The 
^^Milledgeville Georgia Journal, October 19, l8llj. 
^Georgia Senate Journal (iSlU), pp. 18, 22 , 30j Savannah 
Republican, November 8, 1B1U. 
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legislature in December authorized Early to advance $20,000 for that 
po 
purpose, and another advance of $30,000 was made by Early in January. 
General Mclntosh's troops assembled at Camp Hope near Fort Hawkins 
in central Georgia and the decision was made to send 1700 of the 2^00 
troops to General Andrew Jackson at Mobile. One regiment of eight 
hundred under General David Blackshear was to be detached and sent by 
way of Hartford and down the Flint River to destroy Seminole settlements 
some sixty miles east of the Flint. Blackshear, on January 7, 1815, 
reached a point forty-one miles from Hartford where he received orders 
from Governor Early to rejoin Mclntosh on the way to Mobile. 
This change of plans was prompted by a letter from General Mclntosh 
advising the governor of the presence of a large force of British troops 
at Ships Island in the Gulf of Mexico and requesting Blackshear's 
immediate assistance to bolster the military forces around Mobile. 
Blackshear set out immediately to join Mclntosh. He had proceeded 
only a short distance when his route of march was changed once again. 
Governor Early ordered him to move "without delay" to Fort Barrington 
near the Georgia coast. The new orders were issued after it was learned 
that the British had landed troops on Cumberland Island, and there were 
29 
enemy ships anchored off Saint Marys. 
Governor Early rut General Blackshear in an awkward position by 
this order, and Early himself might have been subject to censure for 
Governor Peter Early to James Monroe, January 30, 181^, in 
Governor's Letter Book B, I8l£-l821, p. 8U, Georgia Department of Archives 
and History, Atlanta. (Hereinafter cited as Letter Book B.) 
pq 7Governor Peter Early to General David Blackshear, January 19, 
1815, in Letter Book B, pp. 75-76. 
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his action. Blsckshear's troops were in the service of the United 
States, not Georgia, and Blackshear himself was under General Mclntosh's 
command. Blsckshear's last orders from Mclntosh were to proceed toward 
Mobile. Early justified his order in his letter to Blackshear: 
The defense of our land is the first and most imperious duty. Were 
the regiment under your command without the State, on its route to 
Mobile, I should not interfer /sic/ with it; but, under existing 
circumstance, I should think it criminal inattention to my own 
greatest duty to suffer the force to pursue its destination. You 
are already in the field, prepared at all points, and at the very 
spot most favorable for marching to the relief of the seacoast. 
Before other troops could be collected, organized, and marched 
there, insurrection on one side, and Indian massacre on the other, 
may have produced their full measure of ruin. . . . Under all 
these circumstances, I take on myself the responsibility of order¬ 
ing you with the force under your command to shape your course, 
without delay, to the point invaded.30 
The day after counteracting Blackshear's orders, Early explained his 
actions in a letter to the Secretary of War informing him that because 
of the British invasion of Georgia he had ordered the militia to the 
31 
state's defense. 
On January 11, 1815, the British invaded Georgia.^ A force, 
consisting of two war ships with seventy-four guns, seven frigates, 
numbers of smaller armed vessels, nineteen barges and fifteen hundred 
colonial and Negro troops, established headquarters on Cumberland Island 
30 Governor Peter Early to General David Blackshear, January 19, 
1815, in Letter Book B, pp. 75-76. 
^-Governor Peter Early to James Monroe, January 20> 1815, in 
Letter Book B, p. 78. At this point Georgians had not yet learned of 
Jackson's victory. After the general had subdued Pensacola, he turned 
attention to New Orleans. There he displayed his military genius by 
defeating a superior British force on January 19, 1815, two weeks after 
a peace treaty had been concluded at Ghent, Belgium. 
32 News of the peace treaty had not reached America at this 
juncture. 
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off the Georgia mainland. Two days later, on January 13, barges filled 
with one thousand British troops crossed the sound toward the Saint 
Marys River and before noon the first barge was pushed aground near 
Point Petre. On the Point and in Saint Marys, Captain A. A. Massias 
and a force of ninety-six men defended their posts heroically against 
overwhelming numbers. Massias' forces suffered fourteen casualties 
before they retreated to fom a defense line near Barrington with 
Colonel William Scott's eighty-man militia force at Jefferson on the 
Satilla River.^ 
Destroying the fort and magazine on Point Petre, the British 
advanced and laid siege to Saint Marys. The town was given an ulti¬ 
matum, either surrender or be laid to ashes. Saint Marys capitulated 
and British and Negro soldiers pillaged the village. Few of the 
townspeople were molested, but everything of value, including a large 
quantity of cotton, was confiscated and placed aboard British vessels 
anchored off shore.^ The enemy next turned to the islands of Saint 
Simons and Jekyll, plundering and burning most of the buildings. 
British farces occupied all the inlet water ways between Brunswick and 
Saint Marys, and continued pillaging the south Georgia coast; at the 
same time they continued to encourage the slaves to join them. Negroes 
flocked to the British standard and so successful were the British in 
this effort that General Blackshear, who had arrived at Barrington near 
33Niles' Weekly Register, VII (February U, l8l5), 362 
3t|Ibid., 363. 
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Darien, ordered all boats and canoes between Darien and Brunswick 
3? destroyed in order to prevent the escape of the slaves. 
After successfully plundering the lower southern coast of Georgia, 
the British turned attention northward, moving slowly toward Savannah. 
Panic prevailed in coastal Georgia, especially in the port city of 
Savannah. Fear of the British and the Negroes and rumors of six hundred 
Indians advancing toward Georgia from Florida sent the frontiersmen 
scurrying for coastal towns above Saint Marys. Settlements on the 
Saint Marys, Satilla and Altamaha rivers were abandoned as frightened 
families fled. Governor Early arrived in Savannah on January 22 with 
two thousand troops and immediately declared martial law in the city in 
an attempt to control a people made "senseless by fear." Early insisted 
that the over-powering fear was created by rumors of six thousand 
British troops marching on the city and of Indian-Negro war parties bent 
36 
on raiding the frontier settlements. 
The rumors had no foundation. Before the British could carry- 
out an attack on Savannah, authorities in London ordered British 
officials in Georgia to forego a full invasion of the state as a peace 
treaty was expected momentarily. On January 2k, 1815, the British, 
before evacuating, burned the barracks at Point Petre, seized and towed 
away all vessels in the Saint Marys River, and returned to their camp 
^General David Blackshear to General John Floyd, February 13, 
1815, in Stephen Franks Miller, Memoirs of General David Blackshear 
(Philadelphiat J. B. Lippencott and Company, l8^), pp. U61-U62. 
(Hereinafter cited as Miller, Memoirs.) 
files' Weekly Register. VII (February 1*, 1815), 36U. 
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on Cumberland Island, where they awaited the formal news of the peace 
treaty.^ 
Prior to the British departure from Georgia soil, Georgia militia 
had an opportunity to avenge some of the humiliation inflicted upon 
the state. On February 2U, 20 Georgians and some 30 Patriots from 
Florida surprised a force of 250 British troops near Coleraine, LiE> 
miles above Saint Marys. Caught in a deadly cross-fire, approximately 
130 English troops were killed or wounded. Admiral Cockbum was so 
infuriated by the event that he swore that he would send a force of 
sufficient strength into Georgia to bum every building between the 
38 Saint Marys and the Altamaha rivers. Before he could carry out his 
threat, however, he received orders to cease hostilities because of 
the peace settlement between Great Britain and the United States. 
News of the cessation of hostilities and the signing of the 
Treaty of Ghent reached Georgia on February 25, 1815. Peace celebrations 
throughout the state marked the event. In Savannah, the occasion was 
celebrated by illumination and music with a festive mood predominating. 
The streets were crowded with people of all "colors, sorts and denomina¬ 
tions," who, with lighted candles, on foot and on horseback, enlivened 
the streets with their merriment. The jubilant crowd was led by a 
contingency of military forces as they traversed the streets in procession, 
accompanied by all the martial music that could be mustered. The vessels 
^Patrick, Fiasco, p. 288. 
John Mclntosh to David Blackshear, April 2, l8l5, in Miller, 
Memoirs, pp. U6$-l|66. 
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in the harbor were illuminated, and the air resounded with loud cheers 
and the firing of cannons and small arms. To further enliven the 
celebration, seamen from the vessels anchored in the harbor carried a 
decorated miniature ship through the streets, shouting 'Hon't give up 
39 the shipi" It was evident that Georgians were happy that the struggle 
between the United States and Qigland had come to an end. 
The years from 1808 to I8l5> were difficult for the people of 
Georgia. The embargo, the non-intercourse act and the war created 
severe hardships. Export trade dwindled with the result that the price 
of cotton, Georgia's chief export, plummeted to an all time low causing 
numerous bankruptcies. But despite the financial problems the war was 
not void of benefits. Georgia had become more self-sufficient. As long 
as cotton had sold for a high price, Georgians depended entirely on 
foreign commerce and foreign manufacturers for the necessities of life 
as well as many non-essential items. Before the war, Georgia raised 
no wheat, and the production of com was insufficient for domestic 
use, consequently the state had to import flour and com. The embargo 
and the war changed this dependency. Georgia now raised wheat equal in 
quality to that of any state, and manufactured flour for exportation. 
Before the war, Georgia's Indian neighbors supplied the state with beef, 
while horses and hogs came from Tennessee and Kentucky. Georgia now 
raised horses, cattle and hogs providing the state with an ample supply 
of beef and pork. Furthermore, in former times, while basking in the 
39john Floyd to David Blackshear, February 25, iSl^, in George 
White, Historical Collections of Georgia (New York: Pudney and Russell, 
185U), p. U6U. 
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full tide of comnercial prosperity, Georgians had not produced enough 
material to clothe themselves nor their slaves. A spinning wheel had 
been a rarity in Georgia. The embargo and non-intercourse made "every 
planter ... a manufacturer, and every lady a spinstress," at least as 
far as basic necessities for domestic use.^ 
Although the war of 1812 increased economic self sufficiency and 
made Georgia less dependent on others, Georgians were keenly disappointed 
with the treaty negotiations. The fact that the United States did not 
secure Florida from Spain and the failure to remove the Creek Indians 
from the state's western boundary were viewed with concern. In the 
war of 1812, the people of Georgia saw an opportunity to achieve these 
objectives. They supported a war with Great Britain, although ostensibly 
for the benefit of the commercial states of the northeast, to further 
the interests of Georgia. They were convinced that the United States, 
in order to prevent the British from establishing military bases in 
Florida, would secure the territory from EhgLand's ally, Spain, and they 
worked assiduously to achieve this objective. This project failed, 
however, when the United States Senate refused to sanction subjugation 
of the Floridas. 
Thwarted in this effort, Georgia citizens turned attention to 
obtaining the second objective, that of removing the Creek Indians from 
the boundary of the state. The United States government had promised 
in 1802, as a condition on which Georgia ceded her western lands, to 
remove the Creeks as soon as this could be done feasibly. In 1812, 
^Augusta Chronicle, February 20, I81I4 
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Indians still remained a barrier to Gerogia's westward expansion. When 
a civil war broke out among the Creeks in 1813, Georgians found little 
difficulty in persuading the United States government that the Indians 
were acting in consort with the British and must be defeated. When the 
Creek war was concluded, Georgians expected the federal government to 
carry out its earlier promise. This the government refused to do. The 
Indians were left in the central area of Georgia but were removed from 
parts of Alabama where the government was under no obligation to act. 
When peace was concluded in 1815, the people of Georgia found 
themselves faced with many of the problems which they hoped that the 
war of 1812 would alleviate. It was not until 1819, when Spain ceded 
Florida to the United States, and in 1827, when the federal government 
finally removed the Creeks and Cherokees from the state, that the 
people of Georgia finally realized the objectives so clearly expressed 
in the support of the war against Eh gland in 1812. 
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